Kargil War - 1999 - Highlighting Facts : 26th Anniversary Debate By MVI
- MVI Desk
- 16 minutes ago
- 18 min read
Editor's Note:
26th July 2025 was coincidentally the 26th anniversary of the Kargil Vijay Diwas.A relevant article published by Indian Express surfaced on the social media for which comments were sought from military veterans by MVI . To create further interest and curiosity of readers in this war and trigger responses the pdf of an MVI cover story of Force Magazine, Mar 2021 on Kargil -99 by Col.Vinay Dalvi was posted on MVI Core WA group that drew responses that triggered more and led to a couple of articles by Air Mshl Narayan Menon and Gp Capt AG Bewoor, that were published by MVI . The links/ pdfs of these articles are given in this debate . All the articles with interesting responses led to revealing of several less known / unknown facts about this war and highlighted in this debate . The articles and all the divergent views/ responses from veterans have collectively thrown much light on this 26 years old Kargil War and unveiled some less known / unheard facts ! All these have been compiled in this debate for posterity and enhanced readers awareness .
Editor, MVI
The relevant article link :
Military Digest: Another Kargil Vijay Diwas, another reminder of some uneasy questions that should not be wished away, | Chandigarh News - The Indian Express https://share.google/6LZR5tgAFtwBw08GL
Responses
COL JOLLY CHACKO:
A few may accept:
“Why did Mushraff occupy the heights at Kargil ?
Mushraff was no fool.
The Pak troops on the Siachen Glacier are road maintained, almost to the post.
Indian Army would interdict the road passing through the Neelam valley close to the so-called LoC and interfere with their maintenance.
So he planned to surprise the Indian forces by occupying the heights at Kargil.
Very few know the above information which I have come across during the course of my reading. None of the Indian authors mention this aspect because they aren't aware of it .
BRIG RAJIV WILLIAMS:
Reflections on Col. Jolly Chacko's comments on the Indian Express article of 20 July 2025
I am not in agreement with the comments of Col. James Chacko on the issue of Neelum Valley and its domination by Indian troops as one of the reasons, which initiated Musharraf to occupy Kargil heights and dominate the lifeline of Ladakh from Kashmir in 1999. The Valley in mention is approximately 3.5 km from the LC and has been targeted by Indian arty fire and not small arms fire. This is quite a routine practice and in fact the town of Chakothi, which is closer to LC, during exchange of fire has hardly ever been vacated. The road along Neelum Valley, to my knowledge, is not directly visible from the Indian side unlike Drass – Kargil National Highway, which can be seen from Pak posts at select places like heights near Points 5165, 5353 in Drass sector and few other places closer to Kargil near Point 13620. Hence the Pak troops could effectively bring down fire on any movement along the NH causing disruption in any vehicular movement. It was with this intent that some of these new posts were occupied at those heights by the Pak military prior to Kargil limited war, which started on 3 May 1999.
The article in the Indian Express dated 20 July 2025 by Man Aman Singh Chhinha, does bring out some relevant points, which allude to infiltration in the Sector having taken place much earlier than reported and that does leave quite a few questions un-answered. I commanded Drass brigade soon after the war and having walked to most of the heights captured by our brave troops and some other features to include Point 5706, I saw the enemy dugouts, sangarhs, rock walls created by the enemy. Such fortification from basic military knowledge cannot possibly been constructed in a matter of weeks and I would say even months. With winter snow just about melting in the sector around May – June, the preparations for such construction would perhaps have been carried out a winter earlier and that quizzes me on the aspect of having been surprised – Why?
Perhaps Cdr 121 Infantry Brigade, who during one of my earlier visits in May 1998 during our conversation told me about Pak troops resorting to heavy firing along the Kashmir – Kargil National highway. In fact even my convoy moving from Srinagar to Leh, during the same visit was stopped at Drass till last light, before we could resume our move to Kargil for a night halt. With increased firing along the NH since Musharraf took over as Chief of Pak Army in October 1998, I am sure there would have been some indicators to suggest Pak infiltration attempts being made at those unoccupied heights around Drass and Kargil.
MAJ GEN RAJAN KOCHHAR :
I entirely agree with Brig Rajiv Williams.
In winter 1998–99, Pakistani troops and militants infiltrated Indian territory along the LoC in Kargil, taking advantage of the vacated Indian posts during extreme weather. The objective was to
Cut off the Srinagar–Leh Highway (NH-1A),
Force India to withdraw from Siachen Glacier
Internationalize the Kashmir issue
Led by General Pervez Musharraf, then Pakistan Army’s Chief of General Staff, without full clearance from civilian PM Nawaz Sharif.
Infiltrations occurred in:
• Dras
• Kaksar
• Mushkoh
• Batalik
Key Indian counter-offensives were launched at:
• Tiger Hill
• Tololing Top
• Point 4875 (Gun Hill)
• Point 5140
Operation Vijay (Army):
Massive troop mobilization
Objectives: Evict intruders and regain strategic heights.
Operation Safed Sagar (IAF):
Air support to ground forces; Mirage-2000 jets used for precision strikes. Notable: First use of laser-guided bombs by IAF
Key intelligence failure.
Junior leadership saved the day for us, but at what cost. Ironical !
COL VIKRAM HEBLE :
Though I have not quite understood the rationale behind the quid pro quo argument of the two axes, Col Chako is right that the Neelum Valley Rd could be interdicted.
28 Div dominates it and, in most cases, is in IM rg.
LT GEN HARMINDER SACHDEV:
Response to Col J Chacko
Well, let me start with my linkage to Kargil. I was the Brigade Major (BM) of 121(I) inf bde gp from 91-93, when it was responsible for LC from Pt 5353 or Kaobal Gali, South of it (as we used to call in briefings) to Turtok, a frontage of some 200 plus Kms. The Brigade was then under 3 inf Div at Leh and 15 Corps at Srinagar.
1. Drass Bn only occupied Bimbat LC and Marpola! Even these were thinned out during winters! So No presence from Pt 5353 to Pt 5299 (Bajrang post, created by us in Sep 91) in Kaksar Bn Area. Mushko Valley used to be occupied only during summers as anti-infiltration measure. Similarly, after Shangruti till Turtok No dply except Chorbatla, which was given to BSF Bn (Chhanigund Bn). In depth, Drass-Zojila road used to be occupied at Gumri, Minimarg and Matayin. To protect the road from infiltrators.
2. Kargil Drass road is most vulnerable in Kaksar area. Directly under en observation from en posts Pt 5208, Twin Bumps and Bunker Ridge. It was here that most firing by en arty would take place. Whenever they tried to disrupt move of convoys. Indian Army responded by firing on Neelam Valley Road! It was SOP! Then firing would stop. Bringing in Siachen is too far-fetched. All Pak dply East of Neelam Valley were affected.
3. Kargil heights were occupied by the Pakis to expand the vulnerability of Kargil-Drass road and Batalik-Khalsi-Leh road. Kargil area was brought within Pak arty range when they dply med guns West of Marol in 1993.
4. Creation of posts 5299 NE Spur, Bajrang and Rockfall (Base) and its aftermath, is a testimony of Indian Army soldier’s (6 Para) grit and determination and the local pony/porters unflinching support under the leadership of Brig Satbir Singh, Raj Rif, feared by the Pakis and our very own hierarchy (!) A story to be told some other time perhaps.
Response to Brig Rajiv Williams
5. I fully agree with him regarding infiltration. It is not possible to have all that construction of sangars and bunkers done in one month in 1999! A lot of work was probably done in 1998! This was argued by me with Brig Sehgal who was leading the investigation but he refused to accept. He too had been BM of same Bde before me but probably under pressure from powers that be to prevent The Indian Army being put in bad light !
CMDE BRIJESH:
I knew next to nothing about any of it.
An education for me, this discussion.
KARGIL -1999 : WHAT WE REMEMBER
FORCE ,JUL 2021 COVER STORY
Ref. cover story pdf.
Do write and send what 'you' do remember about the Kargil -99
War ,especially that which has not been said or written by anybody so far .
It's been 26 years since this war, and yet a lot remains unsaid or unwritten about it due to many reasons.
With the fading memories of our gallant soldiers who took part in this war or have first-hand experience of it, there is an imperative need to pen down and document for posterity all these first-hand accounts and experiences.
Since very few real soldiers actually write their experiences, the narrative about any war is dominated by those who write or speak about it . Hence, there are a lot of 'gaps' and 'doubts' that arise in the minds of several readers ,especially those who have experiences about that war or have served in those areas where the war took place !
Hence,in context with the Kargil War -99 , I earnestly request the readers with first-hand experience to write and convey their real / true experiences in the few lines that they can write down for posterity. Collectively, all these responses will hopefully/ surely reduce the gaps and doubts that continue to exist in the existing narrative/s about the Kargil War-99 even after 26 years!
With regards, and thanks,
Col Vinay Dalvi,
Editor ,MVI
Responses
MAJ GEN CD SAWANT:
This is from the horse's mouth. " Rajiv Williams is way off on the issue of Neelam Valley domination. My unit had totally dominated the road running along the Neelam river to the extent that the Pakis were forced to seek permission from us to move their vehicles for logistic purposes.”
More of it when I receive further details.
Taking further the discussion on reasons for Kargil adventure by Pak. as per Gen VP Malik quoting Gen Jehangir Karamat COAS of Pak Army, " It was the offensive actions by 2NAGA to prevent infilt from the Neelam Valley, that lead to the shelling in Kargil Sect. "
Also, as per C Christine Fair, the only foreigner to be allowed access to Pak Army records :
"My own interviews with subjects who had insights into Pak plg for Kargil, suggests that Army was seeking to redeem itself for the 1971 defeat, India's occupation of the Siachen glacier & periodic shelling of Neelam Valley rd & other 'provocations' along the LOC, that prompted Mushrraf to seize & occupy Kargil - Drass Sectors. " ( p 151 of her book, The Pakistan Army's Way of War. ) This pt was separately reinforced by a PAF offr far more clearly that one of the few main causes of the Kargil conflict was: "the effective interdiction of the Neelam Valley rd by IA.”
BRIG RAJIV WILLIAMS:
It is indeed a day of recognition for our troops who fought bravely at those altitudes.
We lost 527 brave hearts with a distinct number of YOs in the list of those Killed in Action.
We salute them and all others who threw back the infiltrators, as also those who defended the country with the grit and determination expected, whether seen or unseen.
However, I have always felt to celebrate the day and say Happy Kargil Vijay Diwas is a little over the hill, and instead, all we need is to acknowledge the action with reverence and respect.
BRIG PRADEEP SHARMA:
History is replete with examples of the sacrifice of our youth at the alter of follies of higher leadership. Kargil divas needs to be a remembrance with quiet grace to commemorate the ultimate sacrifice by selfless soldiers.
COL RAJIV SHARMA :
Kargil Victory was at great human cost, especially of YOs, for blunders created by Senior military officers who did not inform the Govt of the real ground situation,because they felt that Vajpayee, who was focused on his Lahore Visit, did not want to hear the facts.
Subsequently, the Govt tried to cover up their blunder by giving large amount of money to the martyrs and glorifying them.
So while we must remember the sacrifices made by the YOs and Jawans, on this day, we must remind the Senior Defence Hierarchy to render TRUTHFUL MILITARY ADVICE to the Govt w/o tailoring it to suit what the Govt wants to hear !
In my Dte of Army Avn, as Dir Ops, I had strongly advocated periodic Ae Svl of posts, which were vacated during the winters and other important unoccupied areas, but was OVERRULED
by my ADG.
Even at IMA LEVEL, we are taught that Important Ground , if not Occupied, has to be kept under Svl, so also any obstacles.
But for my Boss who felt that flying at those very high altitudes, may increase the chances of a mishap.His record may get spoiled.
Further, there was no such strong demand from XV CORPS/ DGMO.
There were ground reports by local mil Int sources of presence of aliens in the area, but at the top level, such reports were neither proved further by Ae Svl, nor intimated to Def Minister or PM. Ultimately, the Kargil Bde Cdr had to carry the can.
I was with AA until the end of 1997.
So I was well versed with Kargil Bde Sect and our dply when serving with AA.
GP CAPT JOHNSON CHACKO:
I was at CDM when Kargil happened. There were many lectures org to listen to Army HQ/Air HQ reps on what was going on.
My analysis:
There was no integrated planning between the Army and IAF even though structures existed.
Intelligence sharing between the two was Zilch. IAF was brought in out of sheer necessity and not as a part of integrated effort. IAF lost a few ac because of lack of int that the defenders had MANPADS.
Even though IAF Jaguars demolished the Muntho Dalo supply base estd by PA in our territory, IAF suggestion to starve the occupiers of food and ammo fell on deaf ears as quick action was needed by the top brass. We could have prevented so many casualties if that suggestion was agreed to. Any resupply could have been easily interdicted from the Air.
IAF used stand-off weapons to neutralize posts. Very effective, but were derided as cowardice.
CDM was tasked to suggest no. of Ambulance trains needed in an offensive in the mountains. The answer of Four was flashed back. Only One was requisitioned, based on intuition. Many casualties may have benefited with timely medical care.
Army spent Rs 11000 Crs. IAF used the training budget and were thankful for PA for providing live targets for using stand-off weapons for the first time.
Interservices rivalry was at its peak. The KRC did mention about joint/Theatre Commands. Most of the literature thereafter has removed the forward slash (/) and made it Joint Theatre Commands! and shout that it is the recommendation of KRC.
My respects to all those who made the Supreme sacrifice and those who were subjected to suffering, which could have been avoided to the max extent. The top leadership and HDO need to carry the can. May they clear their conscience their own way.
Bofors round was $ 1000. Blacklisted. Kargil we paid $ 10,000 per round from another source.
Arty discovered that direct fire was extremely effective. IAF always does direct fire. It was news to the Arty friends that IAF does not do indirect fire. Lot to learn from integration.
By- Air Mshl Narayan Menon
Editor's Note :
On the occasion of the 26th anniversary of the much celebrated Kargil Vijay Diwas, MVI is privileged to publish this rare personal account of the air operations of this war jointly fought by our Army and Air Force to uproot and evict the deeply entrenched Pak intruders from our territory across the LC . This personal account by the author gives a very realistic overview and deep insight to the reader about the actual air operations of the Kargil War-99 .
Editor ,MVI
GP CAPT TP SRIVASTAVA:
I was selected by Air HQ to carry out the briefing on entire Air Ops during the Kargil War.
The presentation was held at ARTRAC. Vice Adm Surinder Singh was in chair.
From IAF AVM Nana Menon and AVM SP Tyagi. Ĺot of information floating is incomplete, incorrect, and inadequate. The story is too long to be placed on whatsapp. Those who were not part of this combined briefing at ARTRAC seem to know more than those who attended and briefed.
BRIG DS SARAO:
Ref Gp Capt Johnson Chacko response .
Just one addition.
Unlike artillery, tanks also always fire direct (like 'aircraft') only because the target is visible.
If a target is not visible from the ground to the gun crew, conventional artillery has to depend on observers and range tables for indirect fire.
The fact remains that conventional artillery can always fire direct, line of sight if the gun crew can see the target.
You can also fire unconventional (direct- indirect) without the use of range tables and observation. Short distances effective in hills.
Was done during Kargil.
Missiles; cruise or ballistic; short range or inter continental a, d PGM's are bit of a different ball game.
Pre fed data, GPS, guidance systems, range, war head etc make the difference between a 1000 dollar dumb bomb and a very expensive PGM or cruise missile.
Editor's Note
This article by Gp Capt AG Bewoor was triggered by the MVI article by Air Mshl Narayan Menon, titled ' Airborne over Kargil ' published on 27 July 2025.
It gives an illuminating coverage of the Kargil War as it unfolded . It highlights the reactions and responses of the Army and Air Force hierarchy at various levels and also the role played by our 'not so seasoned' political leadership of that period in dealing with the challenges this war threw up and took the entire nation by surprise !
The author ends on a positive note to say that after 26 years, the present military and political leadership are in far better shape , integrated and seasoned, as seen in the recently concluded Operation Sindoor .
Editor , MVI
Responses
COL VIJAY BHATE:
Interesting take by Gp Capt AG Bewoor.
As I remember, during one briefing by VCAS which had stated that we had suffered losses due to restrictions put by the government not to attack their(Pak) military installations ..so on " Even yesterday in LS, the RM talked about everything but refused to own up our own losses. I wonder why ? All govt play their cards the way they suit their political requirements .
COL BIMAL BHATIA:
Ref Gp Capt AG Bewoor article.
There were adequate indicators, but senior offrs remained fixated on counterinsurgency.
Pak brought in an AD gun underslung from a heptr to interdict Kargil - Leh highway in 1993-94.
Adequate indicators about unusual activities appeared in Reports around Jul - Aug 1998.
GOC 3 Div remained immersed in maintaining a zoo!
Inconvenient offrs were axed.
It is a bit uncharitable to call out Maj Jaswant Singh as lacking in personality. With a baritone voice, he also had a commanding presence and spoke deliberately.
MAJ GEN CD SAWANT:
Gp Capt Bewoor has hit the nail on the head !
COL BIMAL BHATIA:
This is with respect to Brig DS Sarao's comment regarding direct shooting on Gp Capt Johnson Chacko's post.
For direct shooting in hills / mtns, any Gunner worth his salt would use the range tables to compensate for non-rigidity of the trajectory.
BRIG RAJIV WILLIAMS:
The article by Gp Capt AG Bewoor is extremely well presented, having brought out the degrees of difficulties in target acquisition and destruction from that altitude is extremely difficult. Hence, the tall claims made by the Air Force on having neutralized gun emplacements and other defensive positions by carrying out precision bombing during ‘Op Vijay’ is certainly an overstatement.
‘Op Safed Sagar’, launched by the IAF on 26 May 1999, despite the many ‘Nos and Not possible’ from then Chief at the Combined Commanders meeting, did encounter a number of difficulties with two ac having been brought down by enemy fire and one MI – 17 having resulting in eight AF personnel casualties.
The military at the time gave the casualties in its daily briefings, and that went extremely well in favorable public opinion toward the Indian military. This was at variance with the preferred non-disclosure made in the case of Op Sindoor. Col Bhate, in his insert, has also clearly brought out the point, which is being questioned by all at the National and International level. The RM even today, in the course of the ongoing Parliamentary debate, has refrained from making any disclosures with regard to Indian ac losses.
COL ANIL BHAT :
We must remember and bless the souls of our soldiers for their outstanding sheer bravery at Kargil and must ensure that we never ever fail as badly as we did in detecting a massive intrusion by 12 battalions of NLI raised specifically for this purpose by Musharraf when he was the DGMO. Because the price we paid of 527 fatal casualties was disproportionately high compared to 47-48, 62, 65, or 71 wars
In Op Sindoor we have overcome all the flaws of Kargil - 99 and touchwood ,may we continue to do so always .
BRIG DS SARAO:
I will clarify further so that non gunners, too, appreciate direct and indirect fire.
The main role of artillery in the contact battle is to provide fire support beyond the range of infantry weapons, in heavier volume, and at much longer ranges.
The target is invariably not seen at the gun end. As correctly mentioned by Col Bimal, here the trajectory and its non- rigidity, rotation of the earth, tgt-gun height difference meteorology, mapping errors, curvature of the earth, coriollis effect, projectile MV, projectile weight etc come into play with range tables for calculation of gun to ( unseen) target data.
By a system of 'laying' the gun is made to point towards a tgt and all the factors enumerated above are catered for so that the round lands on the tgt which is not seen by the firer.
In the case of direct firing by guns, conventionally, it means that you are placing the graticule ( cross hairs! ) of the dial sight or telescope on the target with your EYE.
Depending on experience and equipment, you may cater for movement of the target (lead), winds, range, etc, like a sniper and/or a tank.
This adjustment is done to get a first shot kill by the gun against a tank, lorry, or bunker; though a gun is no match for a tank really in todays battle field. ( Bir Hachiem is history ).
Lastly, do appreciate the difference between an SP gun and a tank. Both look and feel the same!
Range tables -and the ability of an SP gun to fire direct and indirect is the difference. If a tank can do indirect firing at long ranges and has range tables, etc- well, let's call it an SP gun!
COL VIKRAM HEBLE:
A great piece by Gp Capt Bewoor.
It is matured critiques like this, which are required for the education of our budding higher commanders. Hopefully, we shall see more effort in this direction.
GP CAPT AG BEWOOR:
1. About Jaswant Singh, as observed by Col Bimal Bhatia.
I have been in the VVIP room with Jaswant when I was COO in Palam because he, along with many others, was stuck in bad weather going to Jaisalmer where a tank was to be handed over to the army by DRDO. Abdul Kalam, then SA to RM, was also hanging around. Pawar was RM, it was 1993. Indeed, his baritone voice was commanding, but that was all there was to it. In that VIP room, Jaswant from BJP, was just one of the many. Not one other person took any notice of him. He kept asking loudly why Sharad Pawar had not yet arrived, and no one bothered to answer. Jaswant knew the answer, which was that RM will come just a few minutes before departure and will not sit with others. This tamasha went on for a few hours before local and Jaisalmer weather improved, and they left with Pawar arriving just in time. His personality could not elicit much from his Indian colleagues / counterparts that showed what they thought about his stature & personality. I only saw
2. Recall his speeches in parliament as Foreign Minister, baritone-yes, but convincing certainly not ! And what he had to say after the Kandahar hijack and accompanying Masood during the move outbound and later was very insipid and lacking the conviction that should have been supportive of that baritone voice. Do not take umbrage about my observation on Jaswant, it is not personal. Jaishankar has a mild voice but his clarity, conviction, confidence, and ready repartees shows the depth of knowledge and preparation. Sadly Jaswant did not have it. Not his fault, he was not designed for the job, it was thrust upon him, and he could not refuse. I am not speaking ill of the departed, this is education for us to consider what we need as leaders, and who will project India's image correctly to the full spectrum of audiences.
3. Indeed, there was laxity among the military leadership in Kargil, and the reason was the ambience that prevailed in Leh and along the Indus. Siachin was firmly secured, there was time for creating a zoo as stated by Bhatia. But it all trickled down from Delhi, Sena Bhavan, Udhampur, Srinagar, and finally Leh to Kargil. This is not to condemn all those two star and three star officers along with the brigadiers and COs. After all, recall how many aircraft the IAF lost on the ground in 1965, because the ambience in the IAF was such. The protagonists continued and rose to higher ranks, but we did it differently in 1971.
COL BIMAL BHATIA:
Thank you, Bewoor sir, for your clarification.
As COO in Palam, you surely had the right pulse of all VVIP related issues at that time.
MVI Website Readers ' Comments to
Gp Capt AG Bewoor article
GUEST
Weak leadership at the highest echelons. It will take time before the political beaurocratic dispensation understands the magnitude of the problems. You will have to pay the price for a ill informed and weak leadership.
It was indeed a pleasure to read your article.
Wonder why nobody from the army or intelligence has anything to say.
COL SARANG KASHIKAR, VETERAN
Excellent article sir. Having been serving in J and K at the same time and many years again before and after Op Vijay, I exactly understand what you have brought out.
Very well articulated.
Comments