Who Also Failed at Kargil ?

Editor's Note

This article by Gp Capt AG Bewoor was triggered by the MVI article by Air Mshl Narayan Menon, titled ' Airborne over Kargil ' published on 27 July 2025 .

It gives an illuminating coverage of the Kargil War as it unfolded . It highlights the reactions and responses of the Army and Air Force hierarchy at various levels and also the role played by our 'not so seasoned' political leadership of that period in dealing with the challenges this war threw up and took the entire nation by surprise !

The author ends on a positive note to say that after 26 years, the present military and political leadership are in far better shape , integrated and seasoned, as seen in the recently concluded Operation Sindoor .

Editor , MVI

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1. I retired in Dec 1993 and watched OP Vijay from Pune. I knew many who took part as well as those who 'interfered' without invitation. Let me put down what I remember and can relate with Kargil. I have met and spoken with Menon, as well as many others who held important positions in the IAF hierarchy during Kargil. Plus, having flown nearly 1700 hrs into Ladhak on AN-12s and IL-76s I have a fair idea of the geography of that terrain, and I have been taught by my friends about the peculiarities of Close Air Support in those mountains. There is an inviolable rule for transport aircraft operations giving logistic support in mountains of Ladhak, and Arunachal. Of the three components, Aircraft + Mountain + Clouds, only Two can be together. All three can not be put into the same space at the same time. Many who violate this Rule end up as statistics. When you introduce a 4th Factor of Enemy Action, the equation changes, and that is where our Fighter pIlots do a difficult task rather well. But the First Three remain valid, always and and every time.

2. For fighter pilots with their single or even two engines, the majesty of the Himalayas is foreboding, beautiful as it may be. Frankly, this is not what the IAF has trained its fighter / bomber pilots for. It is a weakness that persists in my opinion for many reasons which are not germane just now. That our army is deployed West to East over possibly 3000 Kms in the mountains is a fact that will not go away. Geography and neighbours will not let this change, and we have to live with this reality as long as India exists. Yet our training for CAS in the mountains by fixed wing fighter / bombers is inconsequential. There must be a very good reason for this, but if CAS is to be given to the army where it is deployed, then CAS in the mountains is inescapable.

The IAF has landed many fighters in Leh and even further into East Ladhak, but that is a show of flag, not of offensive capability. That is why when Kargil erupted in May/Jun/ Jul 1999, our pilots did not have any practice in firing weapons at 20,000 Ft. I cannot go into the determinants and peculiarities of rocket / bombs / Front Gun Shells aerodynamics at high altitude. But as stated by Menon, it is very different than at lower altitudes of around 3000 ft where all our CAS operations happen, and we train for that low altitude envelope. To have expected results against well entrenched enemy infantry with small arms, including shoulder borne SAMs was unrealistic. Flying offensive air ops at 18000 to 20,000 Ft is not easy. The density of the air is just 37% of density at Sea Level. Manoeuvring is sluggish, turning radius is greater, engine power is much reduced. If you have not experienced all this with many flights, the pilots will be surprised with what happens to their aircraft at 20,000 Ft. Most non-fliers have absolutely no idea what this is all about, and the civilian population will never know and frankly are unconcerned, naturally, it does not matter to them.

3. Given the inherent reluctance to 'share' intelligence between various agencies is a malaise that impacts everyone, not just India. It is well known and cannot be denied that the practice of protecting one's own intelligence data from others is a universal discomfort. But look at this aspect of Kargil, which no one writes about. Who was with PM Vajpayee then; Advani as HM, Sinha as FM, Fernandes as RM and Jaswant as FM. Poetry and magnanimity of PM Vajpayee with a known enemy fetched nothing. George was a maverick union leader and could not fathom defence complexities, Sinha was a Babu by training and had no exposure to macro finance, Advani smiled more than he implemented. Jaswant had no personality and was poorly endowed in international affairs. These two, Vajpaye and Advani had been in the Opposition for so long with no hope of becoming ministers, that they could not comprehend the magnitude of their office and the power they now held in 1999.

It would manifest during the hijack to Kandahar. These are truths that we do not link to Kargil, but they mattered. The attitude and pronouncements by political stalwarts who are in the cabinet, impact the bureaucratic and military leadership. The major intelligence failure was not so much in the mountains as it was in Islamabad where RAW / IB / Military Intel failed to sniff out the mischief of Musharraf. All articles about OP VIJAY point towards the army / air force / ARC for not finding and recognising the infiltration by regular Pak troops. Much is made of the bakariwalas who triggered the alarm bells, which is true, because no one from 'above' gave any warning, the input from the sheperds was not taken seriously.

4. The other defect was the vacating of high altitude posts in severe winter conditions because it was the practice for years and years, and Kargil was a quiet sector with everyone's concentration being in the Srinagar valley against infiltration. We had been on the Siachen glacier since 1984 and successfully maintained soldiers at heights well above Kargil. Then, to vacate Kargil heights in winter seems a bad choice does it not? To place faith in anyone inside Pakistan is criminal, whatever be your inherent tendency to make friends. The political leadership and their babus who implemented policy, also behaved as though a miniscule trust in Pakistan's honourable intentions was justified. That was a monumental blunder at the highest levels in India, yet we are still looking for mistakes at the tactical level 26 yrs later. It is so easy to find. Observe the efforts to blame the pilots of Air India 171, so easy. Recall that when Siachin exploded in 1984/85, Kargil was calm. When the Srinagar valley burst with terrorism in the late 80s, Kargil remained calm and composed. Then how could it suddenly catch fire in 1999? That Musharraf did what he did caught us completely off balance. The army did exactly what it had been doing for years, why should the Spring season of 1999 be any different? No one writes about this strategic blunder.

5. Indeed, the higher military leadership also fumbled, which was a sin. There was a very definite effort to downplay the possibility of big Pakistani infiltration into the heights at Kargil and the potential threat it created to India's lifeline to Ladhak. Why did this happen? There are many reasons. One was the SOP of vacating the posts in winter and finding them fit for occupation year after year probably since the mid 70s. Kargil was the quiet and calm sector compared to the flare-up in the Srinagar valley since the mid 80s. The attention of everyone was there and not across Zoji La along the Indus. The Air Force was committed to Transport Support operations, and there was no planning or preparation for any offensive / defensive battles in the air in this sector.

With zero cautionary warnings from our own Intelligence agencies in Islamabad, the imagination of all military analysts was hooked onto the calm and stability that prevailed along the placid Indus. When the magnitude of the Pakistani deployment became apparent, India had to start reacting with lethal responses. When this sudden change from extreme calm and tranquility to hyperactivity happened, a restlessness overtakes the protagonists and because of the criticality of the circumstances and the certainty of intense battles, balanced and well thought out decisions elude the leadership. There is a hurry, and the enormity of the mistake that has been made overwhelms those who must now give considered, proportionate orders swiftly. Besides, they must be implementable.There is also the undercurrent of ensuring a cover-up when the enquiries start. Remember, comments are Free but Facts are Sacred.

6. The factor of armed aircraft not violating the 10 Km limit weighed heavily on the IAF. The politico-military equation in 1999 was such that getting immediate access to the PM / RM / HM / FM/ EAM for a Chief was impossible. If the IAF could not violate Indian orders, then how to give offensive support to our army who need it immediately and every day within that 10 Kms boundary? That delay in CAS remains a thorn in the side of the relationship between our Air Force and our Army, and no amount of elaboration can wipe that slate clean. On the other hand, the dilution of the gravity of the Pakistani infiltration as understood by the Army, was never shared and explained to the IAF. Neither in Vayu Sena or Sena Bhavan, nor in Subroto Park where AOC-in-C Western Air Command sits, nor to Menon sitting in Udhampur as an integral part of HQ Northern Command. Had the Army shouted, Blue Murder, SOS, Get Going or we are in trouble, and explained the ground situation as it truly was, without holding back the blunder they had made in assessments, the urgency and promptness would have gone back to Vayu Sena Bhavan in its totality with options and suggested tasking of aircraft. In Delhi, IAF could have and would have, along with the Army, prevailed on RM / PM / EAM to ignore that 10 Km limitation. The holding back of the true dangerous environment prevailing at Kargil hurt the army badly and made the IAF feel let down by the very people who needed them most. Things have changed in this quarter century have they not?

7. It is not for me to ask why were MI-8s, MiG 21s, MiG 27s used first and Mirages later. The answers are known to everyone and those who will answer truthfully are very much around. But once again, when urgency overtakes deliberations, and planners do not get facts with freedom of action, incorrect decisions and solutions will always emerge. The non-negotiable order not to cross the LOC, was misplaced by Vajpaye and Fernandes. The moral high ground has never helped India, not since 1947 all the way till Siachen and against terrorists. Not one nation cared less whether India had gone across and attacked Pakistani positions from across the LOC. Nor would our stand in any international forum get diluted. But the politico-bureaucratic diplomatic combine that existed in India in 1999 was unwilling to unequivocally say, Indian interests, izzat and lives first.

That is one major flaw that caused Kargil to unfold the way it did. Could the PAF have interfered with IAF attacks? Probably, yes. Could the IAF have protected her attacking aircraft from PAF interceptors, most certainly yes. Which organization or forum would have objected if IAF had crossed the LOC? Not one that comes to mind. Pakistan could not have gone to UNO, nor to USA, nor to UK, nor to OIC, nor to EU, nor to Middle East, nor to China, nor to Iran, nor to anyone else. We were under sanctions for the second smile of the Buddha in 1998. Most importantly, who would have known that we have crossed the LOC? Would Pakistan have complained, if yes, to whom after having crossed the LOC themselves? Barkha Dutt need never have been told, and then Col Bikram Singh would not have said anything. Why Vajpaye was frightened along with his cabinet is beyond understanding. That was a defeatist atmosphere in which Kargil battle was fought and won. We should not shy away from saying it, and because it is now accepted, we can do Sindoor & Balakot and more.

8. We are looking at errors which are easy to attach to the faujis, because he is so visible with his machines and weapons. It is the huge politico-bureaucratic- diplomatic-intelligence- corporate combination that made the blunders about which no one speaks or writes. Like Nehru, Mahatma, Indira we also have Vajpayee against whom nothing should be said. Then how do we make course corrections and become atmanirbhar?