AS WE CELEBRATE THE 9TH ARMED FORCES VETERANS DAY -
SOME REFLECTIONS ON
“THE MILITARY AND DIPLOMACY”
Note -
All photos and maps are for symbolic representation only.
Editor, MVI
The Indian Army under colonial rule initially focused on domestic internal security functions and the defence of ever-shifting frontiers. But beginning in the late 18th Century the Raj also put it to expeditionary use. Through the 19th Century, Indian troops saw action in theatres ranging from Egypt to Japan, from Southern Africa to the Mediterranean. Despite growing nationalist opposition, British use of the Indian Army surged in the first decades of the 20th Century. During World War I, nearly 1.2 million Indians were recruited for service in the Army.

When the War ended, about 950,000 Indian troops were serving overseas. According to official count, between 62,000 and 65,000 Indian soldiers were killed in that war. In World War II, the Indian Army saw action on fronts ranging from Italy and North Africa to East Africa, West Asia and East Asia. In South East Asia alone, 700,000 Indian troops joined the effort to oust Japanese armies from Burma, Malaya and Indo-China. By the time the war ended, the Indian Army numbered a massive 2.5 million men; the largest all-volunteer force the world had ever seen.
Yet, it is somewhat of an irony that modern India’s political leadership has been reluctant to recognise the contributions of its military to the making of today’s India. The Indian national movement was deeply divided in its attitudes toward the Indian Army under British rule. These divisions became sharper as the movement confronted the meaning of World War II and the political choices it offered.

While the Indian National Congress, speaking as the principal vehicle of the national movement, condemned the “imperialist war”, individual leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru backed the Allied war effort against the fascists. Further accentuating the ambivalence within India’s political leadership of the time, an “Indian National Army”, led by Subhash Chandra Bose, used Japanese assistance in an effort to forcibly liberate India from the British. It was no surprise then, that the divided national movement could not leverage the Indian Army’s extraordinary contribution to the Allied victory, in the negotiations with the British on the terms of independence, the distribution of the spoils of the war, and the construction of the post-war international order.

Well before the notion of India’s rise even began to be debated, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger apparently argued that India had the potential to emerge as one of six major powers of the post-Cold War international system. He recognised that independent India had internalised the strategic logic that had driven policies in the Indian Ocean, arguing that India’s goals were analogous to those of Britain East of the Suez in the 19th Century—a policy essentially shaped by the Viceroy’s office in New Delhi. That India will seek to be the strongest country in the subcontinent, and will attempt to prevent the emergence of a major power in the Indian Ocean or South East Asia.
Whatever the periodic irritations between New Delhi and Washington, Kissinger had articulated many decades back that India’s “geopolitical interests will impel it in the 21st Century to share some of the security burdens now borne by the United States in the region between Aden and Malacca.” While most American analysts considered such an outcome a remote prospect at the time, Kissinger’s two basic propositions—that India will behave like the British Raj, and that there will be room for burden-sharing between Delhi and Washington in the Indian Ocean arena—are probably being borne out to some extent. When India modified its economic orientation in the early 1990s and embarked on a liberalised and high-growth path, it put paid to its post World War II marginalisation in Asia and the Indian Ocean. Given its size; geo-strategic location straddling the Indian Ocean; a population of over a billion people (and growing) with a demographic dividend in its favour; established democratic credentials; a significant capability in information technology; a large reservoir of scientific talent including in space technology; acknowledged management expertise; proven military capability; and the large market for consumer goods and services; an India that could produce an annual economic growth rate of 7–8 percent was bound to acquire the credentials for engaging in vigorous regional diplomacy. Such rapid economic growth would easily provide for annual defence expenditures of 2–3 percent of GDP, which would be large enough in aggregate terms to modernise India’s military capabilities.

When the tsunami disaster hit the Eastern Indian Ocean in December 2004, India, even while tackling its own commitments in the disaster affected areas of the Andaman and Nicobar islands, and the coastal regions of Tamil Nadu and Kerala, was the first to respond in terms of assistance to Sri Lanka and the Maldives, and in due course to Indonesia. India also quickly decided to join forces with the navies of the United States, Japan and Australia to provide relief and rehabilitation. This effort was very favourably commented on by the international community and of course drew praise and gratitude from the countries affected. Throughout the Cold War, India had deliberately limited its military engagement with Russia to weapons acquisition and had refrained from any service-to-service exchanges, joint exercises or joint missions. That India was now willing to do all these things not only with Russia, but also with the United States, other countries (including China) and groupings, signalled Delhi’s transition from non-alignment and military isolationism, to cooperative security engagement.

To that extent, notwithstanding the internal challenges India faces and the imperative need to focus on economic growth, it would be prudent for the governing establishment and the strategic community in the country to dwell on the fact that within the international setting in the second quarter of the 21st Century and probably beyond, India will have a role to play both regionally and globally. We cannot and must not shy away from this serious responsibility.
The professionalism and competence of the Indian Armed Forces is recognised the world over. Some of our training institutions like the National Defence College in Delhi, the Defence Services Staff College in Wellington, the National Defence Academy in Khadakvasla, the Indian Military Academy in Dehra Dun, the Army, Navy and Air Force War Colleges, and so on, are outstanding by any standards; most countries including the developed ones, vie with each other to secure placements on the courses we run at these institutions. Our own officers deputed to attend courses of instruction at various levels at similar institutions abroad particularly in the developed world, have invariably been outstanding in their performance, and drawn respect and praise; and developed long lasting relationships.
We have over the years provided advice and expertise for setting up training institutions particularly in Africa; as in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Botswana, Uganda, Tanzania, etc. Many others like Rwanda are looking to us for such assistance. We have also had similar inter-action with countries in the Gulf, like Oman.
The contributions and performance of personnel and contingents of the Indian Armed Forces and civilian police in United Nations peacekeeping operations are the subject of praise and admiration by all, including by successive Secretary Generals and the UN Secretariat. Closer home we have had a strong Armed Forces relationship with the Bhutanese Army and with the Nepal Army; whether we have been able to capitalise on the latter relationship in difficult times is another matter.

Given this established professionalism, expertise, and competence, there can be little doubt that we will in the years to come, be called upon by the international community (represented by the UN, or by regional organisations, or by our neighbours on a bilateral or multilateral basis), to deploy our military, possibly together with others in a multi-national force, and maybe take a lead role, for dealing with what are perceived as threats to regional or international peace and security. This is an aspect we need to start deliberating and focusing on. It is time we carried out a detailed assessment and analysis, and evolve an appropriate mechanism to synergise the political, diplomatic and military dimensions of India’s foreign policy.
Together with such initial moves, it is important that we work on a number of other measures in cooperation with regional and global players. It would be useful for joint working groups comprising diplomats and selected military personnel to inter-act at the international level at multilateral forums to share perceptions about coordination and training, exchange of data on trouble spots on a regular basis, mechanisms for consultation, etc. Such moves should be initiated to secure understanding and cooperation from organisations like NATO, the ASEAN Regional Forum, Gulf Cooperation Council, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, etc. It would be most useful to organise events like the symposium conducted by the Indian Navy some years back for Naval Chiefs of the Indian Ocean littoral states. Similar meetings, seminars, symposiums and conferences could be held to discuss the scope and extent of cooperation with like-minded countries including the USA, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Gulf countries like Qatar and Oman, Russia and the Central Asian republics. In doing all this, not only would we be preparing ourselves for assuming a greater role in regional and global affairs, but also conveying a seriousness of purpose.

Having dwelt at some length on the military dimension of comprehensive national power a few aspects that need to be addressed in order promote synergy between the foreign policy establishment and the military merit mention.
The first aspect that probably needs to be addressed is that of ‘turf battles’ as it were. It is time we overcome the distrust, suspicion, envy and ‘I know it all’ attitude that pervades the establishment. It is indeed sad that these non-issues are allowed to take precedence over national interests. It is imperative that we manage this effectively.
Each agency has developed its own approach to address problems. The Armed Forces are without doubt and with good reason dedicated to systematic planning but remain rigid. The foreign policy establishment tries to be more flexible and is disinclined to take risks. There is therefore a need to achieve synergy.
The culture of ‘jointness’ has not evolved at all. We do not yet have it to the desired extent even within the Armed Forces; each Service believes it can win a war on its own. Between the Services and the Ministry of Defence, integration is a myth. It is no surprise that there is no culture of a joint national approach between the different agencies of the Government. Part of the blame can be attributed to the lack of application of the political class towards both diplomacy, as also matters military; and of course the ‘turf’ battles. This serious shortcoming must be overcome.
It goes without saying that in the conduct of military operations, the civilian establishment must not try to exercise operational control. Neither can the military be allowed to craft foreign policy; that is for the political authority and the diplomats to decide. To that extent, the elements of civilian control over the military and the limitations thereof, must be understood. And institutionalised measures put in place .
It would appear that if synergy between the military and diplomacy is to be achieved there must be a method by which exchange of positions within the respective agencies is institutionally provided for. Better use of military attaches for tasks beyond the purely military in our missions abroad, is a case in point.
Going a step further, it is without doubt time that military representation is provided for in all diplomatic delegations and diplomatic representation provided for in defence delegations.

Senior military commanders have little or no experience of working with diplomats and vice versa. This inadequacy must be remedied if we are to take our place at regional and global forums.
Finally, there is little doubt that we need to integrate the military itself for ‘jointness’ within, and at the same time effect inter-agency integration, that is between the military and the diplomat. What many other countries did sequentially, we will have to implement simultaneously.
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