"The Age of Cockroaches: Resetting India's Public Order & Aid to Civil Authority Doctrine" -Col Narinder Singh Dahiya

 Date:- 29th July 2026

Introduction

India's public-order management doctrine was developed for an era in which protests were geographically confined, information moved slowly, and the State retained informational superiority. That environment no longer exists.

Modern protests are digitally coordinated, livestreamed in real time and amplified across multiple social media platforms. Protest organisers increasingly seek to influence public perception as much as government policy. Smartphones, drones and social media have fundamentally altered the relationship between protesters, law enforcement agencies and the wider public.

These developments expose significant shortcomings in India's existing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for crowd management and have important implications for the Indian Army whenever it is deployed in Aid to Civil Authority.

This paper argues that India must transition from a doctrine centred on physical crowd control to one based on technology, legal accountability, evidence collection and information dominance.

1. The Changing Character of Public Protest

Public demonstrations have undergone a structural transformation during the past decade. This realisation dawned upon us during the recent CJP protests at Jantar Mantar at Delhi.

Traditional protests sought to physically disrupt governance or influence decision-makers. Contemporary protests pursue an additional objective—shaping national and international narratives through digital platforms.

Every participant now possesses the capability to:

• livestream police action;

• selectively edit video footage;

• mobilise supporters in real time;

• coordinate movements through encrypted applications;

• generate international media attention within minutes.

Consequently, operational success on the ground does not necessarily translate into strategic success.

Police may restore order yet lose the information battle.

2. Limitations of the Existing Public Order Doctrine

Current SOPs remain largely based on:

• physical barricades;

• baton charges;

• graded escalation;

• physical dispersal of crowds.

These methods evolved before smartphones, livestreaming, facial recognition and AI-enabled information operations became commonplace.

The result is an operational dilemma.

If police use force, they risk allegations of excessive violence.

If they avoid force, they risk obstruction, assaults on personnel and erosion of State authority.

Neither outcome strengthens democratic governance.

3. Emerging Operational Challenges

3.1 Information Warfare

Modern protests operate simultaneously in the physical and information domains.

Video clips often become more influential than official reports.

Narrative dominance increasingly determines public perception.

3.2 Declining Deterrence

Where unlawful conduct is not followed by prompt legal action, deterrence diminishes.

Repeated obstruction of police personnel undermines confidence in the State.

3.3 Technology Asymmetry

While protesters extensively exploit smartphones, encrypted messaging, drones and social media, police organisations continue to rely predominantly upon conventional crowd-control techniques.

This asymmetry increasingly favours disruptive actors.

4. International Experience

Several democracies have modernised their public-order doctrines.

The United Kingdom emphasises negotiation, graded response and universal deployment of body-worn cameras.

The United States increasingly relies upon digital evidence for judicial accountability.

Singapore places greater emphasis upon certainty of prosecution than routine physical coercion.

India need not replicate these models. However, they demonstrate that technology and legal certainty have become central pillars of modern crowd management.

5. A New Public Order Doctrine

Principle One

Replace Physical Dominance with Legal Dominance. The Lathi wielding or baton wielding policeman only paints a poor image of the policeman and is not suitable to modern age.

The principal objective should shift from physically dispersing crowds to identifying offenders, preserving digital evidence and ensuring successful prosecution.

Certainty of punishment provides greater deterrence than indiscriminate use of force.

Principle Two

Technology Before Force

Frontline units should routinely deploy:

• body-worn cameras;

• drone surveillance;

• AI-assisted facial recognition (where legally authorised);

• integrated command-and-control systems;

• digital evidence management platforms.

Principle Three

Smart Crowd Management

Heavy steel barricades should gradually give way to clearly demarcated exclusion zones supported by:

• warning tapes;

• electronic signage;

• legal notifications;

• comprehensive video surveillance.

The objective is voluntary compliance supported by predictable legal consequences.

Principle Four

Accountability of Organisers

Organisers should assume legal responsibility for ensuring compliance with conditions governing public assemblies.

Where violence, attacks on public servants or destruction of public property occur, investigators should examine organisational responsibility in accordance with due process.

Principle Five

Protection of Public Servants

Assaults upon police personnel performing lawful duties should trigger immediate investigation and expedited prosecution.

Protection of those enforcing the law is fundamental to preserving public confidence in democratic institutions.

Principle Six

Modern Police Training

Police academies should substantially expand instruction in:

• behavioural psychology;

• digital evidence collection;

• strategic communication;

• media engagement;

• cyber awareness;

• constitutional law;

• AI-assisted policing.

Future officers must understand that every operation is simultaneously tactical, legal and informational.

6. Implications for Military Aid to Civil Authority

The transformation of public protest has equally significant implications for the Indian Army.

Future deployments are likely to occur in an environment characterised by:

• continuous livestreaming;

• social media mobilisation;

• facial-recognition technologies;

• coordinated disinformation campaigns;

• heightened judicial scrutiny.

Additional operational risks include:

• exposure of military personnel and their families to online harassment;

• psychological influence of protest narratives upon soldiers through social media;

• operational compromise through real-time broadcasting;

• increased litigation following deployments.

Accordingly, Army SOPs for Aid to Civil Authority should be comprehensively reviewed.

Priority areas include:

• enhanced operational anonymity for deployed personnel;

• universal deployment of body-worn cameras;

• integrated drone surveillance;

• restrictions on live broadcasting of sensitive military operations through authorisation by law;

• strengthened legal protection for soldiers acting in good faith under lawful orders; AFSPA should be imposed and the area proclaimed as disturbed area before deployment of military in Aid to Civil Authority to maintain law and order

• dedicated information operations cells to counter misinformation.

Conclusion

India's public-order doctrine reflects the realities of the twentieth century. Future disturbances will be digitally coordinated, information-driven and legally contested.

The challenge is no longer simply controlling crowds. It is maintaining legitimacy while preserving public order in an era where information moves faster than force.

A doctrine built upon technology, evidence, professionalism and legal accountability will better safeguard constitutional freedoms while enabling the State to respond effectively to increasingly sophisticated forms of civil unrest.

The objective should not be stronger coercion, but smarter governance—where the rule of law is upheld through transparency, technological superiority and predictable enforcement rather than physical force alone.