Reimagining Air Power Limitations

 Airpower is like poker. The second-best hand is like none at all-it will cost you dough and win you nothing.

                                                                                                             Gen George Kenney

Background

Is it a coincidence or have circumstances conspired to trigger the sudden focus on IAF and air power? Podcasts, TV interviews and opinion pieces on IAF and airpower have dominated Indian defence news in recent days. Discussions on Op Sindoor have revived and so has the focus on Theatre Commands. Old wine in a new bottle, some would say! Among the writings and interviews, there was an interesting opinion piece by a senior and experienced Army veteran titled, “Limits of Airpower, Implications for Theatre-ization”. It raised some issues regarding limitations of airpower revealed during recent or ongoing conflicts and questioned IAF’s presumed reluctance to usher in Theatre Commands. The opinions on airpower in the ongoing wars and theatre commands ignore some vital and contextual issues. It is therefore necessary to present the correct perspectives on the issues raised. Some views may appear a bit provocative, but it will only be fair to put across the other side of the coin.

A nation’s military instruments: land, sea and air forces, each have their unique strengths and limitations. A war is much more than the operations of one service. In most cases if one has the lead role, the other two services support or act as deterrents, dividing the adversary’s attention. In Op Sindoor, airpower was in the lead with the Army shouldering some tasks and Navy in the deterrent role. During the Doklam face-off and the 2020 Ladakh  stand-off, the Army handled the heat single-handedly, while airpower stood by silently as a deterrent. There is little doubt that airpower has its limitations but when it is called upon to assume a lead role in any operation, it is with the belief that it is ideally suited to achieve the stated political goal. Employment of airpower therefore, must always be discussed with reference to the context and the military objectives derived from the political goals.

It would be akin to stating the obvious that warfare in recent years has undergone a metamorphic change, particularly air wars. Air-to-air engagements occur at well beyond the “Beyond Visual Range” era of the last decade. Rarely ever would two opposing fighters come within visual range of each other. Fighters launch missiles or guided bombs at targets deep inside enemy areas remaining well within their own territory. Fighters are expected to control and launch two/three similar performance unmanned vehicles (Collaborative Combat Aircraft) at heavily defended targets remaining at safe distances. The other aspect is that no AD system howsoever, multi-layered, networked or using AI, can stop everything. Some aircraft, drones or missiles will always get through. As long as our vital assets and fighting capability is not degraded, there is little choice but to live with this. Happenings in Ukraine, Russia, Iran and the Middle East are examples. In addition, one needs to be very careful about the relevance of experiences emerging from earlier or ongoing wars since happenings there are specific to their tactical, operational and strategic contexts.

Perceived Gap in Jointness

There is a passing mention of Kargil 1999  and the 2020 Ladakh stand-off as instances of gaps in jointness. The first is well publicised and a lot of water has flown down the river since then and revisiting it may not bring anything new to the table. There is limited public information on a gap, if any in 2020 crisis. Use of airpower was considered escalatory during the Kargil conflict and severe restrictions were imposed on its employment in that operation. Subsequently, with better appreciation, airpower has been used punitively in the West  in 2019 and again last year, confident of the ability to control escalation. Against China, at least in the near future a war if any, will be a ‘war of necessity’, i.e. India is unlikely to initiate the war. With a strong, well trained and capable Army deterring intrusions, India initiating employment of offensive airpower will be viewed as escalatory, more so considering that the PLAAF is a substantially larger force. Offensive airpower in such a case may be employed only in a deep crisis or as a response to an air threat. Prudence in employing airpower in such situations should not be assumed as gap in jointness. With centralised planning set in motion, as observed in Op Sindoor, jointness will follow, narrowing the gap in the coming years.

Ukraine-Russia War

Moving on, the Ukraine-Russia war is said to have exposed the limits of airpower. In reality, the most puzzling aspect of this war is Russia’s reluctance or inability to exploit its overwhelming airpower superiority to dominate the air.  In the initial three-four days, Russian fighters engaged Ukrainian fighters and attacked radars and SAMs. However, after the initial attempt to threaten Kyiv failed, the Russian air force did not pursue control of the air missions and thus lost the initiative. The respite enabled Ukraine to set up a multilayered AD system and it quite rightly adopted the strategy of ‘Air Denial: denying the use of airspace over its territory to enemy airpower. Such a strategy does not envisage offensive airpower employment and is thus a defensive strategy suited to the weaker side. The AD system was set up with help and weapons from the West and cutting edge technology from companies such as Palantir. Since Russia did not attempt to disrupt the Ukrainian AD set up using EW or hard-kill, it suffered losses and was unable to operate freely and support the ground war effectively. Russian air support dwindled over time, and the land war turned into a high attrition, grinding contest, reaching a stalemate after the initial Russian advances.

If the reference to limitations of airpower is in relation to the high visibility employment of drones, then one needs to understand that drones and aircraft are siblings: belong to the same family. There is no denying that drones have made an impact, being used as the primary weapons to support this land war. However, it may be pertinent to point out that the drone interception rates or losses  are reported at nearly 85-90%, with Ukraine requiring a supply of over 10,000 drones every month.  Leaving aside the hoopla, the bottom line remains: Ukraine despite its proven expertise in drones has been unable to regain any of its lost territory. Ultimately, outcomes are what matter in war. On the contrary, the few times that Russians dropped LGBs from well within their territory, the targeted Ukrainian ground forces were reportedly decimated.

Did this war reveal the limits of airpower? More than the limits, the war revealed that airpower employed inappropriately may prove a liability to ground forces and achieving control of the air requires persistence. It also highlighted that in a ground war between near peer adversaries, absence of air support can lead to a high attrition stalemate.  

USA-Israel-Iran War

The other war purported to have displayed the limits of airpower is the USA-Israel war against Iran, in which despite causing extensive destruction in Iran, airpower did not lead to a victory. While President Trump kept changing the goalpost every morning before breakfast, the obvious political goal was to trigger a regime change, following which Iran could be coerced to give up its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Recollect, this was the third attempt at stopping Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons, first by Israel alone, then by the B 2 bombers strike on nuclear stations and now an open war. The proposed regime change was by eliminating the top political, IRGC and military leadership through well timed precision air strikes. This was the military objective derived from the political  goal. Backed by precise intelligence, the USAF and IDF struck various targets in the first few days and liquidated the Ayatollah and the top IRGC and military leadership. But the expected uprising, turmoil and change of regime did not materialise. Was this due to limitation of airpower or due to incorrect political assumption that liquidation of leadership would lead to an upheaval and a coup of sorts? Airpower achieved the task it was given with great finesse. That the political prediction of regime change did not happen is political misreading. The political failure cannot be foisted in the shoulders of airpower as its limitation. As Gen Deptula said about use of airpower in Iran, “… The resulting limits are not limitations of airpower. They are limitations of strategy."  As a matter of fact, considering the leadership’s grip on power, a land invasion also may not have led to a regime change, unless like medieval times the change was done by physically eliminating the current setup and enthroning a compliant replacement.

Flexibility of Airpower

One attribute of airpower, flexibility,  is at times misunderstood in the context of Theatre Commands.  ‘Flexibility’ of airpower has many facets and layers. Flexibility implies ability to quickly switch roles from AD to strike and weapons from air-to-air missiles to long range GPS/TV/inertial/Laser guided precision missiles or even dumb bombs. It also implies aircraft massing at a time and place, from bases spread across thousands of kilometres, to amplify impact and effects. Aircraft from the East can fly across the breadth of India and hit targets on the Western borders and return with mid-air refuelling. A few hours later the same aircraft and join battle if needed, on the Northern borders. This attribute of flexibility will be curbed if bureaucratic controls are imposed to move from one theatre to another. Jointness or integration within a theatre is unlikely to make up for the loss of versatility.

Air Operations During Siachen-Ladakh Crises

A surprising question tends to be raised on who will decide on priority of tasking Rafales or S-400s if Siachen and Ladakh flare up simultaneously? As of now both sectors fall under Western Air Command and the needs of both sectors can be addressed without any problem. This is where flexibility of airpower would be most exploited. The aircraft, SAMs, AEW&C  etc will be under control of  WAC, which can switch assets as the need arises. But just imagine if the two sectors are placed in different Theatre Commands: West and North. Bureaucratic controls will hamper operations. How will strike aircraft separation be ensured? Who will control the launch bases since both theatres may use the same bases? Which Command will ensure AD C&C in sectors separated by a few insignificant miles? How does the C&C change when intruding aircraft or drones cross from one theatre to the next. Or will AD be centralized? Smooth flow of operations may be hindered if two adjacent sectors fall under different theatres.

Paucity of Resources and Theatre Commands

The major problem with proponents of theatre commands is the tendency to ignore the primary issue bedevilling the IAF: paucity of assets: fighters, AEW&C, Refuellers and strategic lift aircraft. Dividing meagre resources among possibly three Theatres, SFC and A&N is akin to sharing poverty.  With limited assets of aircraft, force-multipliers and supporting systems, it is unlikely that any theatre command would be self-sufficient to independently meet the requirements of AD, offensive strikes, interdiction and other missions. Supplementing resources from other theatres would obviously involve bureaucratic processes leading to delays and restrictions. Such divisions will negate the attributes of airpower which make it so indispensable in any war. Paucity of resources is best tackled by exploiting flexibility with centralization. In view of such obvious operational constraints imposed by paucity of assets, it would be prudent to await fleet augmentation before pushing through such structures, ignoring obvious operational problems.

Conclusions

The above discussions highlight that airpower must be employed within its known limitations. It cannot be expected to ensure regime change or physically hold territory. If a decisive victory is planned with airpower in the lead role, what constitutes victory needs to be defined. Secondly, airpower is at its best when employed offensively and this requires freedom of operation. This freedom may take the shape of dominance, superiority or in near-peer engagement, limited control in time and space. To secure own assets, it is necessary to create a multi-layered AD system with integrated anti-drones weaponry. However, air denial as a strategy is ill-suited to the IAF which focuses on offensive operations.

Effective air operations in a Theatre Command structure requires resources currently unavailable with the IAF. It would be prudent to await fleet augmentation before the restructuring. Geographical delineation of Theatres must take into account operational viability in adjacent sectors. The process of centralised high-level planning and decentralized operations as demonstrated in Op Sindoor should continue till the major restructuring exercise fructifies.

Lastly, it is emphasised that the essential nature of airpower in war and peace first displayed  in the Persian Gulf war of 1991, was reinforced in Serbia in 1998, Afghanistan in 2001, the Middle-East, Balakot 2019, Op Sindoor and Iran. Its ineffectiveness in the Ukraine-Russia war was an exception, that proves the point. Last but not the least, drones are best viewed as a complement to manned fighters rather than replacement. Employed together the siblings are a war-winning combination.

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NOTE - The views in the article are the author's personal views based on his study / research / experience.The maps and photographs are for symbolic representation only.