EMPLOYMENT OF AIR POWER - HOW ILL-INFORMED VIEWS AFFECT THE DEBATE ON THEATRE COMMANDS -Gp Capt Johnson Chacko
Date:- 11 September 2026
There have been attempts in the print media to misguide the public regarding the objections by the IAF regarding the implementation of Theatre Commands. Please refer to The limits of air power, implications for theatre-isation - The Hindu and How Pakistan’s new military structure could challenge India’s escalation strategy.
War is about imposing a nation’s will over another. Russia has not yet been able to impose it’s will on Ukraine and so have the USA and Israel over Iran. However, we have been able to impose our will over Pakistan, in Op Sindhoor which has been paused, as Pakistan pleaded with us to stop fire and we agreed. This has been done by employment of Air Power alone. Neither side crossed the border on land, nor were projectiles fired from the sea.
Probability of success of any system is never 1 i.e. 100%. Irrespective of the sophistication of our defensive shield an adversary’s offensive weapon system will penetrate it, just like our Army has not been able to prevent intrusions by terrorists for the last four decades with a huge investment in the boundary fencing and other systems. Air Power has its limitations, just like the application of land or sea power. Drones use the medium of air. It becomes a part of employment of Air Power irrespective of who operates them. We need to delink the medium from the operator.
Air Power alone may not win a war, but without it no war can be won is a maxim that developed over the years and is still valid. Air Dominance is difficult to achieve. Iran shot down an F-35 even after proclamations by the US President that the Iranian Air Force has been shot out of the sky and their Navy sunk. We achieved near Air Dominance during Op Sindhoor. We should be able to prevent Pakistan from using terrorists (achievement of aim) whereas against China solutions will emerge if people who matter do critical thinking and generate out of the box solutions.
Drones have emerged as a more affordable alternative to the interceptor missiles used to shoot them down. We are already developing drone-based interceptors that can achieve cost parity.
The author has conceded Chinese superiority and that is the first step towards a defeat. History has proven time and again that larger numbers do not guarantee victory whether it was the conquests of Chenghis Khan on land or the Arab Israeli wars of 67/73 in the air. Against the Chinese, we need to multiply the natural defence provided by the Himalayas. As far as Air Power is concerned, IAF has an advantage over the PLAAF due to the altitude. Unlike the Army, lower heights have more potential for any Air Force to launch as the air is denser and higher altitude is a liability.
In 2004, the IAF decimated the USAF in an exercise held at Gwalior. Each air combat lasted for about 1.5 to 3 minutes, and all USAF F-15 aircraft were shot down during that time frame by our Russian origin fighters. It was all over the US press. The Pentagon demanded that the F 22 program be accelerated if they need to fight IAF! We should not be cowed down by assumed Chinese superiority.
Op Sindhoor demonstrated that integration from the planning level leads to joint-ness. Besides the Army, Navy and Air Force, Space Assets, Electronic Warfare and Cyber warfare were also integrated. The integrated application of military force worked very well with existing organizations for it. The issue is lack of integration from the planning stage itself like Kargil, as the IAF was brought in only after the Army exhausted most of its options. All the past operations where the IAF was taken into confidence at an early stage, the results have been exceptional. An example is the Meghna River Crossing in 71 and Op Sindoor recently.
Flexibility is one of the tenets of use of Air Power. The author appears to be unaware of the others. Even in Op Sindhoor, the IAF required assets to move from the East to the West. The resistance is secular among all air warriors as the Theater Command concept goes against the tenets of employment of Air Power and it has got nothing to do with career progression as alleged. This resistance is all over the world. India is the Theater for the IAF. PM is the de-facto head of the warfighting organization of India. The council of ministers headed by the PM gives political will and directions on what needs to be achieved. How it is to be achieved is left to his subordinates which includes besides the NSA, CDS, COAS, CNS and CAS, heads of other departments like Cyber, Space etc. Plans are made in an integrated manner and bounced off the political leaders and operations are executed. Deviations needed are approved at the appropriate level. The concept of a single point of military advice flies in the face of a former CDS proclaiming in public that the IAF is a support service! The political leadership needs to collate the inputs from all branches before arriving at a decision rather than relying on an uninformed individual opinion. The lesson is that centralized advice can improve coherence, but it can also concentrate error if the adviser is wrong. Multiple assessments and opinions prevent this trap even in the face of loss of coherence.
The Joint Coordination Center is for conducting the entire operation from planning to completion of execution. Consensus which is different from coordination is not the objective. Conflicts will be resolved at a higher level. What is needed is not a Theater Commander, but an IHQ (Integrated Head Quarters) for a region, which does the planning during peace time and when the need arises, the component commanders of Land, Sea and Air come under the Head of IHQ to execute the operations. It goes without saying that plans are integrated involving all of them and they come in to execute them. IHQ plans exercises where joint training takes place. This provides for centralized planning and decentralized execution in an integrated manner. Head of IHQ does not need to have troops from all services under command during peace time.
To the question ‘If Ladakh and Siachen flare up in the same week, where will the limited pool of Rafales and S 400s be deployed’ the answer is that we have an Army in every direction such as Western, Northern, Central, Eastern, Southern and South-Western, but we have only one heavily depleted Air Force to split among them. They will get Air Power in penny packets which are of no use to the nation if the air assets are divided among them. With Theater Commands each may get a few more assets. One of previous COAS publicly announced, “We will fight with what we have”. Similarly, the IAF will have to fight with what it has. Leave it alone till the strength builds up and do not complicate the issue with Theater Commands which is an unsolicited digression. Perceived unity of command will emerge when IHQ becomes operational. IAF still has the conviction to win a future war.
Joint application of military power will always be better than the sum of the power applied by individual armed forces. That is achieved by integrating all armed forces, Space and Cyber as was done in Op Sindoor. How would introduction of Theater Commands enhance combat effectiveness? If it has been done in Andaman Nicobar Command, how much percentage has combat effectiveness increased? Employment of Air Power is an escalation, and the Theater Commander will need Political approval. Does the C in C ANC have the powers touse air power allocated to ANC without approval of the political leadership? How is it different from the current arrangement? Will Space, Cyber and Information Warfare also be integrated under the Theater Commander? The USA from where this concept has been imported has Commands under which Theaters are made for specific operations like Iraq, Iran etc. We intend to replace the existing Commands with Theaters. What does the nation gain?
Evolution and Pre-Eminence of Air Power.
The basis of creation of an Armed Force is the medium in/on which it operates. Historically it is land warfare that started initially. The principles and tenets of Land warfare have evolved from the wars and battles fought over many centuries. Then came Maritime warfare, using the medium of water. Principles of Maritime warfare also evolved after many Naval battles and they are different from Land warfare. Those who controlled the seas controlled the world became an adage. Then came Air warfare and the adage that who controls the Air controls the world. initially as a part of the Army like the Royal Flying Corps of the UK and US Army Air Force, primarily to support the Army (Close Air Support). During such operations the enemy aircraft interfered and they had to be prevented and so the interceptors (Air Defence) came into being. Taking it further the bases from where these got airborne were attacked to prevent the interceptors from getting airborne and so bombers (Counter Air Operations) came into being. This was further extended to destroy the war making potential of the enemy by attacking the factories that manufactured war machinery and the economy (Strategic Bombing). To achieve this, dams were busted to flood a valley that had industries with war making potential. Since the role of air power had different characteristics and principles of operation, the statesmen of the time decided to convert them into full-fledged Air Forces. Then it became evident that those who control the air control the battle on ground or sea. Nazi Germany could not invade Britain before Luftwaffe could defeat the RAF. RAF won the Battle of Britain. In 1971 we could not have crossed the Meghna or carried out the Tangail Para drop without air dominance over East Pakistan. Similarly, the outcome of the battle of Midway between the US and Japanese Navies was decided by air power alone without both fleets coming into contact to fire at each other. Subsequent wars such as the Gulf war and the recent Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict prove that without air power no war can be won. Relegating air power as a close air support arm for the Army and Navy would be like General Yahya Khan ordering the PAF to conserve resources for close air support of the intended massive, armoured thrust into India by General Tikka Khan during the 71 War which never materialised. PAF could not be used for offensive missions after that order and sat out during the rest of the war.
The characteristics of Air Power as enumerated by Col Philip Mellinger of USAF, which I agree with are enumerated below. My comments are in parenthesis.
1. Whoever controls the air generally controls the surface. (Refer above)
2. Air Power is an inherently strategic force. (It can take on targets which when attacked have far reaching effects. Attack on the Governor’s House in Dhaka during liberation of Bangladesh)
3. Air Power is primarily an offensive weapon.
4. In essence, Air Power is targeting, targeting is intelligence, and intelligence is analyzing the effects of air operations.
5. Air Power produces physical and psychological shock by dominating the fourth dimension-time.
6. Air Power can conduct parallel operations at all levels of war, simultaneously. (It can take on the leadership of the enemy forces without first defeating the troops that guard the border. Once the head is cut off the body and tail can’t do much)
7. Precision air weapons have redefined the meaning of mass. (Concentration of Force is not essential to decimate a target as accuracies have increased to the extent of dropping a bomb in a bucket.)
8. Air Power’s unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by airmen.
9. Technology and air power are integrally and synergistically related.
10. Air Power includes not only military assets, but an aerospace industry and commercial aviation.
It is true that the IAF does not function in a vacuum. It is not true that IAF functions only to support the Army and Navy. IAF functions to support the Nation. Some roles are in support of the Army and Navy. Simulated sinking of a ship in Malacca straits one day and the strait of Hormuz the next day using the same aircraft demonstrated by the Air Force last year is but one role in support of the Navy. That is the reach of the IAF and for IAF there should be only one India theatre. We should not disperse such assets in penny packets especially with a strength of just 30 Squadrons?
IAF is the fastest to react and provides deterrence. In 65 it swung into action within an hour when asked to do so. Air Power escalates the conflict and it needs Government sanction. No Chief can privately decide to use it just because the Army wants it. As a young officer, when the orders came, our Squadron deployed at three different locations in 3.5 hrs and sent a signal to the C in C that we were ready for our first mission, for the second mission we need our technicians. Army moves at 2 knots, Navy at 20 knots and IAF pilots have flown at 2000 knots. Flexibility, mind sets and decision-making ability varies accordingly. We need to exploit the strength of each force for true integration.
Strategy of Employment of Air Power
Which operations are done sequentially or simultaneously depends on the commander orchestrating employment of air power. In the IAF, he is the Commander in Chief. Squadrons execute the missions ordered by him. Tasking by the Army and Navy have many more steps. With the joint organisations that have been established there has been no failure of integration when the operations have been planned together ab-initio, like the Meghna Crossing in 1971 and recently in Op Sindhoor. The problems surface when the entire picture is not available to the IAF at the start and the Air Force learns it by surprise when they appear as in Kargil.
In Pakistan the Field Marshal has effectively assumed enough powers to integrate the Armed Forces, Strategic Forces, Intelligence (ISI), what people can perceive (ISPR), the political leadership and the government under his control. That is a good example of a Theatre Command. India is the Theatre with the PM heading the council of ministers as the Theatre Commander. We don’t need that to be divided. We need to reduce single service commands with geographies that are contiguous to the West, North and South.
The authors have a blinkered view of employment of Air Power and that is understandable as they do not have knowledge of the domain of Air Power. Even though their exalted status as senior officers give them illusions of all knowledge, they should refrain from delving into domains that they have not blossomed in. Psychologists refer to this as the Dunning – Kruger effect.
About the Author's Relevant Experience:
He has done the staff course abroad and was a Directing Staff at DSSC and also at CDM in the Faculty of Behavioural Sciences.
NOTE - The views in the article are the author's personal views based on his study / research / experience.The maps and photographs are for symbolic representation only.
Comments