Operation Sindoor & Way Ahead

If one were to distil the essence of what triggered Operation Sindoor into a single line, it would be this: Pakistan had lost its relevance in Kashmir. The Valley, once gripped by conflict and militancy, had transformed into a hub of peace and prosperity. Tourism was booming, with 93 daily flights landing in Srinagar and a record-breaking 8.25 lakh visitors flocking to the Tulip Garden in April 2025. This resurgence wasn’t accidental—it was the result of steady, deliberate, and bold political steps taken over the past six years.

The abrogation of Article 370 on 5 August 2019, followed by the removal of Article 35A, marked a decisive break from the past, ending the constitutional special status of Jammu and Kashmir. The final stamp came on 11 December 2023, when the Supreme Court upheld the government's actions, firmly integrating the region into the Indian Union. These developments delivered a blow to Pakistan’s long-standing narrative and strategic calculus on Kashmir, making it increasingly irrelevant to the region’s political future. In desperation, Islamabad turned to asymmetric warfare to regain some measure of influence.

The trigger for the brutal Pahalgam massacre, which prompted Operation Sindoor, was not only Kashmir’s changing ground reality but also the 11 March 2025 hijacking of the Jaffar Express by the Balochistan Liberation Army. What should have been yet another symptom of Pakistan’s internal disintegration quickly escalated into an anti-India tirade when DGISPR Lt Gen Ahmed Shah Chowdhury accused New Delhi of orchestrating the incident. In a bizarre press conference devoid of any credible evidence, he showcased an outdated lecture by NSA Ajit Doval and a coerced confession from Commander Kulbhushan Jadhav, who had been abducted from Iran years ago.

This was followed by inflammatory remarks from Pakistan Army Chief Gen Asim Munir, who resurrected the two-nation theory and proclaimed Kashmir as Pakistan’s “jugular vein,” even drawing divisive communal comparisons between Hindus and Muslims. These provocations were not rhetorical flourishes—they were ideological signals and operational greenlights.

The Pahalgam attack appeared to serve three purposes: to derail Kashmir’s return to normalcy, to foment communal discord within India, and to salvage the crumbling image of the Pakistan Army, which has been reeling from blows dealt by the BLA and its internal crises.

What marked Operation Sindoor as a turning point was India’s unprecedented clarity of purpose, both politically and militarily. Unlike past terror incidents—from the 2001 J&K Assembly and Parliament attacks to the 2002 Kaluchak carnage and the 2008 Mumbai massacre—India’s response this time was not limited to dossiers, diplomatic démarches, or candlelight vigils. Even the 2016 surgical strikes and the 2019 Balakot air raid, while significant, pale in comparison to the scale and depth of this operation. For the first time in 54 years, India struck the Pakistani heartland—Punjab—deploying cruise missiles such as BrahMos and Scalp. This operation also witnessed the first drone warfare exchange between the two countries and, notably, Pakistan’s use of ballistic missiles like Fatah-I, Fatah-II, and Hatf-I. India achieved all operational objectives swiftly and decisively. It neutralised all nine identified terror hubs—later confirmed to be even more numerous by Pakistani admissions—destroyed 11 airbases, and incapacitated roughly 20 per cent of Pakistan’s air assets. The combat effectiveness of indigenous systems like Akash and imported platforms like Rafale and S-400 was validated under real conditions. So devastating was the Indian campaign that Pakistan’s Director General of Military Operations was compelled to request a ceasefire.

Operation Sindoor also served to shatter myths and expose strategic weaknesses. The much-hyped Chinese JF-10 jets, HQ-9 air defence systems, and PL-15 missiles proved ineffective. Turkish Songar drones and Yiha-III missiles similarly failed to deliver. India also operationalised a new strategic tool: the Indus Water Treaty, signalling a shift in the long-standing water-sharing arrangement. Crucially, there was no international backlash. No UN Security Council resolution was passed against India, and no major power intervened. Diplomatic maturity underpinned the entire operation. India’s precision targeting and calibrated restraint ensured minimal civilian casualties, despite taking significant operational risks. Terror camps were hit at night to avoid civilian damage, and Indian air defence units exercised restraint, sparing commercial flights in Pakistani airspace that had been irresponsibly left active.

This measured response affirmed India's assertion that its actions were calibrated, proportionate, and strategically restrained. Perhaps the most symbolic moment came when images emerged of Pakistan Army officers—including Corps Commanders, GOCs, IGPs, and even elected MLAs—attending the state funerals of slain terrorists. This conclusively exposed the fallacy of Pakistan’s “non-state actor” narrative. Yet, the strike on Nur Khan airbase, part of the Chaklala cantonment near the Kirana Hills where Pakistani nuclear weapons are stored, was a critical inflexion point. It sent a message not just to Pakistan but to the broader strategic community. China’s role in the background—arming Pakistan, supplying aircraft and missile systems, and shoring up the CPEC—points to a larger geopolitical game. China prefers to use Pakistan as a proxy to tie down Indian military attention on the continental front, deflecting Indian focus from maritime domains such as the Malacca Strait, which is vital to Chinese trade.

This necessitates a strategic shift. India must expand its air force squadrons from the current 30 to at least 42.5 to ensure preparedness for a potential two-front war. Integrated theatre commands must be accelerated, not delayed by inter-service inertia. These commands promise not decentralisation but optimal integration with the flexibility to concentrate force when needed. Furthermore, the Agniveer recruitment scheme demands urgent review. The COVID-induced pause in recruitment, coupled with the new scheme’s rollout, has left a shortfall of nearly two lakh soldiers. This gap must be addressed on a war footing. Parallelly, the development and deployment of systems like BrahMos-NG, enhanced cruise missile integration, and next-generation air defence platforms must be prioritised.

The most significant lesson from Operation Sindoor is that India must be prepared to fight its wars decisively and independently. No nation will fight our battles for us. Let the success of Operation Sindoor not be a reason for complacency but a call to action. It should serve as a strategic bridge to the long-term mission of Viksit Bharat 2047—a self-reliant, secure, and globally respected India.

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About the Author :

Brig Advitya Madan was CO 15 Punjab in Lebanon , Cdr 27 Sector at Chura- Chandpur , Manipur in 2013 and Brig OL of HQ West Comd in 2014.