Operation Sindoor-After Action Review And Continuous Learning

It's not about whether Sindoor was a 'great victory'. It's not about whether we have achieved deterrence and shaped the future balance of power for the next half a century. For that is debatable and will depend on an individual's thought process-- and ultimately how the future unfolds.

What is more important is whether we have learnt any lessons for the future.

To that extent, the outcomes of Op Sindoor will remain debatable — not because they are unimportant, but because they depend on interpretation and perspective. What matters more — and what must concern us most; is whether we have learned the right lessons.

History rarely offers neat conclusions. The immediate outcomes of a military operation or strategic manoeuvre often fade in comparison to the long-term implications it sets in motion. In that sense, Op Sindoor is not a final chapter, but a point of inflection. It invites us to reflect, to assess, and above all, to prepare.

Have we understood the dynamics that brought us to this moment — the intelligence gaps, the diplomatic fault lines, the operational frictions? Did we use our combat power optimally to achieve our political and military aim? Have we examined how our adversaries responded — not just tactically, but politically and psychologically? And perhaps most critically, are we institutionalising the insights gained, or merely celebrating them?

The utility of power lies not just in its application, but in the discipline with which it is studied after it has been used. If Op Sindoor is to mean anything beyond its temporal achievements, it must serve as a learning milestone. A moment where egos are set aside, where narratives are challenged, and where doctrine evolves.

We must ask: What did we miss? What did we get right? And what will we do differently next time — not just in battle, but in the run-up to it, and in its aftermath?

The future will judge us not by the declarations we make today, but by the preparedness we carry into tomorrow.Op Sindoor was not the end — it was a warning shot from history itself, reminding us that true strength lies in reflection, adaptation, and relentless improvement. Not in mere self congratulations!

So we come back to the same question.

Are we missing something important in so many of our discussions and justifications pertaining to the (ongoing) Op Sindoor??

Leave aside the political and military justifications for our response to the Pahalgam carnage. Or whether we could have applied the might of our military power more effectively.

The critical point to be noted in all this brouhaha is whether we used our air power effectively? Not that our air power is lacking or has been found wanting-- rather it is the requirement to appreciate the limitations on employment of air power. Particularly so in highly contested environments having advanced anti-air and integrated air defense systems.

In a well-protected air defence environment, the cost of maintaining air superiority or seeking low value targets with multi-million dollar aircraft will outweigh the benefits, especially when faced with high risks and prohibitive losses.

This is especially true when an adversary has a creditable air defence network (combination of early warning, seek, track, engage) in place, whether it's advanced SAMs, BVR's, electronic warfare, or early warning radar systems.

In such situations, the flexibility, speed, and precision of air power will invariably be hampered, and its effectiveness dramatically reduced.

Obviously the lesson learnt is that in modern warfare and in multi-domain operations-- air, land, sea, space, cyber;

capabilities must be integrated for maximum effectiveness.

If one domain (like air power) becomes heavily contested or too costly to maintain, it may necessitate the use of other tools or methods—such as ground-based forces, drones, missiles, artillery strikes, cyber warfare, or even unconventional warfare tactics. In these circumstances, relying heavily on air power alone, which is increasingly vulnerable in complex environments, is no longer ideal.

And what about the non use of the formidable Russian air force after the first few months of the Ukraine conflict!? There is a lesson to be learnt from this ongoing conflict too.

As a nation having no great technological or military industrial base to produce state of the art weaponry or aircrafts or have the ability to match the combat power of the Russian airforce, Ukraine took a strategic decision to defend itself against air attacks and interdiction with NATO-supplied air defense systems like the Patriot, NASAMS, and even older Soviet-era S-300s.

Russia's aircraft were thus faced with serious threats from a combination of surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, and increasingly sophisticated radar and EW systems.

A poor mans solution to negate the 'air advantage' of the Russians. Very wisely, early in the war, the Ukrainians created a contested air environment where Russian aircraft were at high risk of being shot down.

In addition, Ukraine has been deploying significant EW systems to jam Russian radars, EW elements and communications which make it more difficult for the Russian Air Force to operate freely in Ukrainian airspace.

To their credit, Ukrainian forces have demonstrated increasing proficiency in using these systems to create kill zones for Russian aircraft.

Russian air tactics have changed dramatically with more and more reliance on stand-off weaponry (like cruise missiles) and drones, rather than BAS or counter air operations or air superiority missions or (attack) helicopter operations or which require active air engagement and put pilots at greater risk.

Expensive air assets are limited and Russia has faced significant losses in terms of aircraft—both fighter jets and helicopters. This has likely made commanders more hesitant to commit air assets in a high-risk environment, especially as losses can quickly escalate.

In short, the Russian Air Force's limited involvement in Ukraine is a direct reflection of how modern warfare dynamics, particularly anti-aircraft systems, EW, and multi-domain threats shape the operational environment.

All this emphasises the growing relevance of non-contact warfare (cyber, EW, space, missiles, drones) and the changing role of air power in multi-domain operations.

Lessons we must incorporate in our military doctrines.