Op Sindoor: Brouhaha over Initial Losses & Political Constraints

In war, then, let your great object be victory, and not lengthy campaigns

—Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Op Sindoor was a spectacular display of political sagacity and military capability by a confident and mature India. It marked a paradigm shift from extreme self-restraint to an India willing to flex its muscles if its interests or security are challenged. While there is little doubt that the operation was a big success and achieved the political and military objectives, there has been severe criticism of certain aspects of the operation, namely initial losses, political constraints, and acceptance of a ceasefire when in a dominating position. These issues gained public attention when India’s military attaché to Indonesia mentioned that the initial losses were due to political constraints of not attacking Pak’s military assets to preclude escalation. The operational imperative of suppressing enemy AD before undertaking air strikes was waived off, and this resulted in losses. This statement kicked up a storm as some media outlets and opposition parties went to town questioning the government’s reluctance to reveal losses and its interference in military operations.

One strategic analyst went so far as to state that after the political leadership identifies the objectives, it should be the military’s outlook and business to take the operation to its logical end. It was also stated that, “Fine, India dominated the exchange, but what did it achieve after domination?”

Criticism of the government and its policies or actions is par for the course. But for the criticism to make sense, it must be based on logic and facts. It would thus be worthwhile to examine the validity of criticism of the conduct of Op Sindoor.

There is nothing novel or odd about political constraints on military operations. Limited wars, as the term implies, are fought under constraints that keep the war contained geographically or avoid attacks on civilian populations. During the Korean War, allied forces fought under the constraint of not crossing the Yalu River to prevent escalation into a wider direct war with China. In IPKF operations in Sri Lanka there was the constraint of not using heavy artillery.

This limitation impacted operations and contributed to higher casualties. Similarly, during the Kargil War there was the political constraint of not crossing the LOC. Though militarily impractical, this imposed limitations on direction and approaches for air and ground attacks. It also precluded degrading the supply lines of the intruders. Such constraints resulted in higher casualties and the lengthening of the war. Wars with limited objectives would always involve political constraints. Most of the constraints are imposed to prevent escalation or preclude external pressures or intervention. History reveals that constraints generally lead to higher risks and likelihood of greater losses.

Wars are essentially political in nature and are aimed at achieving certain policy goals. The last word must, therefore, always rest with the political executive. During the Korean War, Gen. MacArthur was fired by President Harry Truman due to a series of disagreements and public criticism by Gen. MacArthur of the administration not permitting action beyond the Yalu River. The political goal of avoiding escalation prevailed over the military’s point of view. Since the ultimate aim of any war is political, the political executive must always retain the prerogative to guide operations towards its goals. During Op Sindoor, the political restraint imposed on the strikes on terrorist hideouts on the first night was not unusual or exceptional. It was aimed at precluding escalation.

The political leadership restraining attacks on military targets cannot be faulted. The view that once the first shot is fired, the military should see the operations through till the end without political intervention is far-fetched. It questions the very purpose of war and puts the cart before the horse: the driving force for war, which is politics. The criticism of the restraint on the first night’s strike is hardly justified.

The reason for the losses on the first night was not due to the restraint or lack of preparedness of the IAF but due to a technical surprise engineered by the Pak Air Force. IAF was taken by surprise by Pak’s employment of the export version of the AAM, PL15 E. The kill chain involved launch by J10C aircraft and guidance and lock-on with the aid of data link provided by the AEW aircraft. This extended the kill range well beyond the anticipated range, leading to a surprise. Such surprises are common on the first day of any war. Like IAF, PAF was also surprised by India’s impenetrable AD system as well as the lethality of Brahmos and SCALP missiles. Surprises are to be expected in any war. But the true test of any fighting force lies in overcoming the handicap quickly and retaliating effectively. This is what the IAF did by quickly evolving new tactics and, within no time, responding by destroying Pakistan’s AD setup and following up with devastating air strikes on their main air bases. Political restraint thus had minimal impact on the IAF’s operations, and the initial losses proved to sharpen the instincts of the IAF.

On the aspect of ceasefire, it is common knowledge that nations resort to the use of force or prosecute war to achieve certain military objectives derived from political goals. Use of force is not an end in itself but a means to an end, which is the political purpose or policy. After the achievement of the objective, further military operations would result in what is commonly called “mission creep.” Mission creep is a gradual shift in objectives during a military campaign, which often results in unplanned operations and unanticipated consequences.

Mission creep is very tempting, especially when in a dominating position in wars. However, history reveals that it can result in adverse consequences. The USA’s involvement in Vietnam started with the objective of limited support to South Vietnam against the communist North. But over time objectives escalated to large-scale troop deployments, bombing campaigns, and direct combat. In the end it proved traumatic with a disastrous withdrawal after significant loss of life, resources, and esteem. Similarly in Somalia, US intervention started as humanitarian aid and then expanded to nation-building and ended poorly in the incident of "Black Hawk Down." Closer home, the Indian peacekeeping mission in Sri Lanka in the 1980s aimed at enforcement of the peace accord, expanding to disarming the LTTE and then to a full-fledged counter-insurgency war against the LTTE. As expected, Op Pavan ended with heavy Indian losses and without any political or military gains. Mission creep, though a tempting option when on the ascendant, results in unforeseen and unpleasant consequences.

India accepted the ceasefire offer of Pak DGMO after it had achieved its military and political objectives. The military briefing clearly highlighted this, and the same was conveyed by the PM subsequently in his address to the nation. One can be certain that this was reiterated to convey the message to Pakistan. Any further operations may well have resulted in a full-blown war, something that India wanted to avoid.

If Op Sindoor had continued even after the achievement of the initial objective, it may have escalated into a land war. Land wars involve the capture or loss of territory. Territory is a highly emotive issue, and the side losing territory will never accept a ceasefire. Generally, the winner would insist on retaining the captured territory, while the losing side would never stop operations till the lost territory is regained. The ongoing Ukraine-Russia war is an illustration of this phenomenon: an unending war with Russia unwilling to surrender captured territory and Ukraine forced to continue operations till it recoups its losses. The war is in its fourth year with no end in sight, with Russia highly stressed economically and on human resources, while Ukraine is devastated with generational growth written off.

In contrast, Indian leadership had tremendous clarity on its priority of economic growth and avoided getting enmeshed in long wars. Earlier on, India avoided a full-blown war with China without losing face, despite the Galwan tragedy. Both China and India behaved maturely and skirted all-out war. India similarly avoided unnecessary escalation in operations against Pakistan, accepting a ceasefire on achieving its objectives, despite being in a dominating position. In hindsight, India's acceptance of Pak’s ceasefire offer was a mature and wise decision, keeping in mind its grand strategy. The criticism in this regard thus does not hold much water and seems unjustified.

Author’s By Line

Gp Capt PK Mulay, VM (Retd), is a test pilot and has commanded an Attack Helicopter Sqn.  He is a PhD in Defence Studies.