Enhancement of Combat Effectiveness: A Suggested Solution for the Theatre Command Imbroglio

Introduction

The task of the Armed Forces is to provide an environment for peaceful comprehensive national development, even though, the CDS is operational, the Defence Secretary is responsible for the defence of India as per the rules of business of the GoI. Preventing external aggression and countering it when called upon to do so is the primary task of the Armed Forces.  Comprehensive national development appears to be the aim of the nation as can be culled out from the Constitution. At independence for countering external aggression, we had the Army, Navy and Air Force in the domains of Land, Sea and Air.  As per the Union War Book, the IAF is responsible for the Air Defence of India. When it came to application of military power to pursue the will of the nation, they executed actions in their respective domains contributing to the political aim. A fist has more power than the sum of individual fingers and integration is essential to enhance power. Joint structures evolved, to integrate air power with the land forces where air operations in support of the Army and the Navy. The globe has 30% Land, 70% Water but is covered 100% by Air. For effective Air Defence there are many more operations that are needed.

The need to apply Military force in an integrated manner has been felt for a long time. If the design of Higher Defence Organisation (HDO) is with the objective of achieving this, then we can achieve true integration. This then would be the litmus test during testing/wargaming before implementation. To achieve this level of integration we need to design an organisation de-novo without the baggage of what exists now and trying to force fit the existing elements into a paradigm that does not permit the potential of each force to be fully exploited. The end states need to be defined on what we intend to achieve. What will be the percentage of enhancement of integration or jointness with the Theatre Commands in place? Will the CDS control all operations? There are more questions to be answered than what meets the eye. The Nation should benefit out of this process.

Evolution and Pre-Eminence of Air Power.

The basis of creation of an Armed Force is the medium in/on which it operates. Historically it is land warfare that started initially. The principles and tenets of Land warfare have evolved from the wars and battles fought over many centuries. Then came Maritime warfare, using the medium of water. Principles of Maritime warfare also evolved after many Naval battles and they are different from Land warfare. Those who controlled the seas controlled the world became an adage. Then came Air warfare and the adage that who controls the Air controls the world.

 initially as a part of the Army like the Royal Flying Corps of the UK and US Army Air Force, primarily to support the Army (Close Air Support). During such operations the enemy aircraft interfered and they had to be prevented and so the interceptors (Air Defence) came into being. Taking it further the bases from where these got airborne were attacked to prevent the interceptors from getting airborne and so bombers (Counter Air Operations) came into being. This was further extended to destroy the war making potential of the enemy by attacking the factories that manufactured war machinery and the economy (Strategic Bombing). To achieve this, dams were busted to flood a valley that had industries with war making potential. Since the role of air power had different characteristics and principles of operation, the statesmen of the time decided to convert them into full-fledged Air Forces. Then it became evident that those who control the air control the battle on ground or sea. Nazi Germany could not invade Britain before Luftwaffe could defeat the RAF. RAF won the Battle of Britain. In 1971 we could not have crossed the Meghna or carried out the Tangail Para drop without air dominance over East Pakistan.

Similarly, the outcome of the battle of Midway between the US and Japanese Navies was decided by air power alone without both fleets coming into contact to fire at each other. Subsequent wars such as the Gulf war and the recent Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict prove that without air power no war can be won. Relegating air power as a close air support arm for the Army and Navy would be like General Yahya Khan ordering the PAF to conserve resources for close air support of the intended massive, armoured thrust into India by General Tikka Khan during the 71 War which never materialised. PAF could not be used for offensive missions after that order and sat out during the rest of the war.

The characteristics of Air Power as enumerated by Col Philip Mellinger of USAF, which I agree with are enumerated below. My comments are in parenthesis.

1. Whoever controls the air generally controls the surface. (Refer above)

2. Air Power is an inherently strategic force. (It can take on targets which when attacked have far reaching effects. Attack on the Governor’s House in Dhaka during liberation of Bangladesh)

3. Air Power is primarily an offensive weapon.

4. In essence, Air Power is targeting, targeting is intelligence, and intelligence is analyzing the effects of air operations.

5. Air Power produces physical and psychological shock by dominating the fourth dimension-time.

6. Air Power can conduct parallel operations at all levels of war, simultaneously. (It can take on the leadership of the enemy forces without first defeating the troops that guard the border. Once the head is cut off the body and tail can’t do much)

7. Precision air weapons have redefined the meaning of mass. (Concentration of Force is not essential to decimate a target as accuracies have increased to the extent of dropping a bomb in a bucket.)

8. Air Power’s unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by airmen.

9. Technology and air power are integrally and synergistically related.

10. Air Power includes not only military assets, but an aerospace industry and commercial aviation.

It is true that the IAF does not function in a vacuum. It is not true that IAF functions only to support the Army and Navy. IAF functions to support the Nation. Some roles are in support of the Army and Navy. Simulated sinking of a ship in Malacca straits one day and the strait of Hormuz the next day using the same aircraft demonstrated by the Air Force last year is but one role in support of the Navy. That is the reach of the IAF and for IAF there should be only one India theatre. We should not disperse such assets in penny packets especially with a strength of just 30 Squadrons?

IAF is the fastest to react and provides deterrence. In 65 it swung into action within an hour when asked to do so. Air Power escalates the conflict and it needs Government sanction. No Chief can privately decide to use it just because the Army wants it. As a young officer, when the orders came, our Squadron deployed at three different locations in 3.5 hrs and sent a signal to the C in C that we were ready for our first mission, for the second mission we need our technicians. Army moves at 2 knots, Navy at 20 knots and IAF pilots have flown at 2000 knots. Flexibility, mind sets and decision-making ability varies accordingly. We need to exploit the strength of each force for true integration.

Strategy of Employment of Air Power

Which operations are done sequentially or simultaneously depends on the commander orchestrating employment of air power. In the IAF, he is the Commander in Chief. Squadrons execute the missions ordered by him. Tasking by the Army and Navy have many more steps. With the joint organisations that have been established there has been no failure of integration when the operations have been planned together ab-initio, like the Meghna Crossing in 1971 and recently in Op Sindhoor. The problems surface when the entire picture is not available to the IAF at the start and the Air Force learns it by surprise when they appear as in Kargil.

Evolution of Theatre Commands in India

In the Kargil conflict, the Army wanted to keep it in house. When it started going out of hand Air Force was approached. Use of Air Power is an escalation and that needed Government sanction. That is considered as a trigger for Theatre Commands, which will facilitate the use of air power in house as the Theatre Commander will command those assets. The moot question is “Will a Theatre Commander be able to bypass the Government and escalate the situation by using Air Power, just because he has control of air assets?”

The first time I heard the term Theatre Command was in 2005, when I was a DS in the department of strategic management at CDM. A CDM study was conducted by a team of about 10 officers of which three were from the Air Force. All the three dissented to the recommendations of that study. Their dissent was ignored in the Commandant’s report to HQ IDS which had ordered the study. Similarly, the views and objections by Air Force officers in all subsequent committees were either deleted or modified to suit the establishment of Theatre Commands. It is like situating the appreciation, an anathema to anyone who has done the staff course. No Air Warrior worth his salt will agree to this re-organisation. It is important to understand why this is the case and resolution has evaded the formation of Theatre Commands for the last two decades.

Definition

A Theatre Command can be defined in the Indian context as A joint command responsible for all military operations within a designated geographical theatre, exercising operational control over forces from all three services to achieve a common military objective.

Comparison with the USA

Unlike the US system where Theatres exist within Commands (like Iran theatre within Central Command), from where this concept has been borrowed, we intend to replace our Geographical Commands with Theatre Commands. The US theatres are transient in nature whereas ours would be permanent.

Advantages of the Current System

Where the current system works well is in deep service expertise, Service chiefs directly control their forces and proven effectiveness in peacetime administration and operations. In a modern conflict, an operation along a border may require Army ground forces, Air Force combat aircraft, Naval support, Space, Cyber, and Special forces. However, operations deep inside enemy territory or in the high seas will not need Army ground forces. Under the present arrangement, integration at planning stage and coordination during execution must occur across multiple command headquarters and service chains.

Advantages of Proposed Theatre Command System

Theatre commands aim to remove these seams by placing all relevant capabilities under one operational commander even though integrated planning and coordinated execution still needs to be done by the individual Service components.

Composition of Theatres

The Norther Theatre Command would combine relevant Army formations, Air Force assets and Intelligence & surveillance resources for operations along the northern border.

Western Theatre Command will focus on Pakistan front and integrate forces currently spread across Army and Air Force western-oriented commands.

Maritime Theatre Command will focus on the Indian Ocean Region and would bring together Naval fleets, Maritime air assets, Amphibious and island defence forces under one maritime commander.

That does not mean that all assets will be distributed. The core will still retain strategic assets like the B-2 Bombers of the US, used in the Iran theatre were not under command of even the Central Command.

What the Change Entails

The restructuring plan appears to change the current Service centric system to Mission centric system where the operations will be conducted by the CDS through the Theatre Commander using assets of the Army Navy and Air Force. However, force multipliers such as Space, Cyber, Special Forces, Electronic Warfare, Information Warfare, Internal Security etc. will not be a part and will still need integrated planning and coordinated execution.

If by definition the Theatre Command is “A joint command responsible for all military operations within a designated geographical theatre….”, do we have adequate air assets to be allocated for each Theatre when we have a depleted Air Force, which had to move assets from the East to the West for a small operation like OP Sindoor. There is no point having Theatre Commands with hardly any assets. Air Power is inherently flexible and can be shifted rapidly across theatres. Theatre Commanders will be reluctant to let go of the air assets even when it is needed in another Theatre. Air assets could become tied to local commanders rather than being centrally massed at the decisive point for concentration of force. Each service has developed specialized operational expertise over decades. Potential risks of theatre-isation include erosion of service identity, dilution of specialized knowledge and friction over operational priorities. Balancing jointness with professional service competence remains a major challenge.

The Dip in Combat Effectiveness

Paradoxically, integrating commands into theatre commands can initially make decision-making more complicated. Questions arise such as; Who controls scarce fighter squadrons? How are strategic reserves allocated? Who adjudicates competing theatre requirements? Until doctrine, processes, and authority are clearly defined, new command structures may create confusion rather than efficiency.

Assuming that re-organisation is intended to enhance combat effectiveness, a major change like this can temporarily reduce effectiveness during transition as reporting structures change, procedures evolve and a time needed for a new headquarters to gain experience. History shows that organizational reforms often produce a short-term dip in the learning curve before benefits emerge. Do we have a contingency plan for an untoward situation during this period? Unlike some countries, we face continental threats, maritime challenges, two active fronts, under a nuclear overhang. Therefore, simply copying the US, Chinese or Pakistani theatre models may not suit Indian requirements. In Pakistan the Field Marshal has effectively assumed enough powers to integrate the Armed Forces, Strategic Forces, Intelligence (ISI), what people can perceive (ISPR), the political leadership and the government under his control. India's eventual structure must be tailored to its own strategic environment.

Principal strategic risk is that a poorly designed theatre-isation could reduce flexibility, especially in the employment of air power and other scarce strategic assets. The success of theatre-isation will depend less on creating new headquarters and more on creating a genuinely joint doctrine, clear command relationships, and mutual trust among the three services. Management of change needs to be planned in detail and quantum of enhancement in combat effectiveness needs to be quantified to measure for a review as to what has been achieved after the change.

Differences in Operational Cultures

The three services have different operational cultures. Examples include; The Army's emphasis on territorial control. The Air Force's emphasis on centralized air campaigns. The Navy's emphasis on maritime strategy. These are the result of historical lessons learnt. They have different levels of control and execution in the command chains too. Reconciling these approaches inside a single command structure requires mature doctrine and leadership. On a lighter note, the Army may not like the Air Force work culture and vice-versa. Lack of a common joint doctrine has been identified as the biggest challenge in implementing theatre commands.

The debate is no longer "whether India needs greater jointness"; it is "how to achieve theatre-isation without sacrificing the strengths of the existing service system."

Management of Change.

Integration is essentially a management issue. To have an objective analysis we need to involve experts of repute, in Organisational Design ably assisted by Colonel level Directing Staff from College of Defence Management who teach Force Structuring with the clear objective of synergy as stated above as the focus. They need to analyse the problems as stated, reach an agreement as to what exactly the problem is and reach a consensus on the problem to be solved. Then they can design an organisation that can achieve synergy. Once the ideal organisation structure if defined, minor tweaks can take place to suit the existing force levels. Roles and tasks can be defined, communication levels and structures evolved, interlinkages within the Armed Forces can be firmed up and linkages within the Government can be decided.

Suggested Solution.

The existing appointment terminologies are intentionally not being used to prevent confusion. Taking it forward from the suggested Indian Military Doctrine at http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/indian-military-doctrine-an-analysis/ We need to have Western, Eastern and Southern Regions. Each Region may have the same geographical extent for the Army, Navy and Air Force with an Army Commander, Navy Commander and Air Force Commander commanding their forces within that region akin to what the GOC in C, FOC in C and AOC in C does now.. They will subsume the existing Command Area of Responsibility (AOR) in those areas.  Since the geographical extent is large, we need to divide the responsibility functionally. During peace the functions of Administration, Maintenance and Training may be vested in those who command these Regions by the respective Armed Forces as they are the domainexperts. Planning, Conduct of Operations, Procurement, Intelligence. Logistics, Inspections for readiness for War and other activities of an integrated nature need be carried out by newly appointed Integrated Force Commanders (IFCs) for these regions mentioned as RMAs (Regional Military Authorities) in the above article. During full scale operations the regional commanders become subordinated to  the IFCs as Land Component Commander, Naval Component Commander and Air Component Commander in addition to retaining the appointment of C in C. They order their troops as per the integrated military plan approved by the IFCs. After operation they move back as commanders of the region. Similarly at the National level for operations, The COAS, CNS, CAS and the CDS (referred to as Central Military Authority in the above article) form a Committee of Four (C4) to decide on the conduct of operations. If the operational task is small then a Task Force Commander can be designated by C4 and forces moved under his command for that operation and revert after the operation is over. CDS and IFCs would essentially control activities which can be integrated during peace time. This will need a deeper study by a body of experts as stated above so that contingencies can be ironed out in a proactive manner before implementation.

The current assets that are meagre and can be used for all regions of the entire Nation should be placed under C4 for optimum utilisation during operations till the required strength is built up. Inter-regional allocation of resources can be done by C4 when needed. This would create a flexible and nimble organisation delivering synergy in application of Military power.

Selection Process.

The CDS and IFCs should be men of proven calibre (Character, Ability and Performance) and required potential, approved by the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Defence after an in-camera hearing of the assessment of their potential, so that political leanings, favouritism and nepotism are ruled out and a stamp of approval by bi-partisan political leadership is endorsed. This will negate the objections that Officers who may feel bypassed may harbour. At that level it does not matter as to which Armed Force the individual belongs to or what his seniority is. It should be purely based on merit.  

There has been a lot of slugfests in the media regarding the controversy that has been created. However, everyone understands the need for integration but the main issue is how it is being executed. There are arguments about what an individual should have said, peacetime exercise of powers over another service, which service will lose how many 3-star posts and which service will gain, definition of Theatre Commands with prefix of Maritime, Land Theatre Commands to make it domain (medium) specific to exclude Officers from a service from aspiring to become a Theatre Commander and who comes under whom. The Government may clear the air before a setback to whatever integration has been achieved so far manifests. All stake holders need to be taken on board.

The process needs to be guided by utilising the strengths of each force and mitigating the weaknesses, from the wisdom bestowed upon us by history and based on conscience rather than the consequences of which service gains or loses 3 star posts. History doesn't repeat itself to people who know history. Do we need to reverse the evolution of Air Power application for the sake of theatre-isation?

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Gp Capt Johnson Chacko (Author) has done the staff course abroad and was a Directing Staff at DSSC and also at CDM in the Deptt of Strategic Management.

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NOTE - The views in the article are the author's personal views based on his study / research / experience.The maps and photographs are for symbolic representation only.