Dispelling Myths About IAF Operations

Date :-30 August 2026

Airpower is the most difficult of military force to measure or even express in precise terms.-Winston Churchill

Background

Recently the IAF and airpower have grabbed attention in news, social and TV media with numerous interviews, podcasts and articles. This may have been triggered by the news about the likelihood of ushering in Theatre Commands (TC) in the Indian Military. Views of IAF retired brass gained importance since many thought IAF’s issues regarding the setting up of TCs had been resolved. Discussions on TC on Twitter and other platforms were a bit heated and the debate continues. In the meantime, an article in The Print, an online magazine, merited attention because of its harsh criticism of the IAF.

As per the article, IAF’s doctrine mandates sequential operations and in that the first step is to gain air superiority, then undertake interdiction and finally, support ground forces. This as per the author would prove fatal in a short-and-swift conflict. The argument is then stretched to suggest that like the Pakistani command structure, India also requires a single campaign commander who need not treat air superiority as a separate goal, but support the immediate short-term campaign. These appear to be opinions, since they are not backed by examples, data or references.

The argument is based on a false premise. The AF doctrine indicates control of the air as a priority, but nowhere does it mention that this priority translates into a fixed or predetermined sequence in which control of the air missions would always be conducted first, irrespective of the context or the goals. The false premise led to faulty conclusions, leading on to suggest the need to control air effort by a single campaign commander akin to a TC setup. IAF’s doctrine is misinterpreted and misunderstood and this leads to some unfounded recommendations.

Air Forces as a rule consider control of the air as a necessary prerequisite for air power to realize its full potential. But that does not translate into air campaigns always starting or focusing on air superiority missions to the detriment of other tasks. Views similar to these are held by many who believe that the IAF fights its own private battle in which achieving air superiority is the primary goal. This argument is then stretched further to buttress the creation of TCs which would enable a more effective employment of air power when controlled centrally.

Issues Needing Clarifications

Two features of this narrative require to be corrected: first, that IAF focuses initially only on control of the air leading to the neglect of urgent requirement to support the land battle and second, that IAF unnecessarily places priority on control of the air.

Air Power Employment During Wars

At the outset it needs to be stressed that war time operations are aimed at achieving military objectives derived from the political goals. The military instruments, land, sea or air forces, are employed in a manner best suited to achieve the political goal. There are no fixed sequences in terms of employment and the instrument ideally suited is given the lead role. Notions that the IAF fights its own private war are thus unfounded.  A peek into history and some recent conflicts would help disabuse warriors of this assumption.

In the ongoing USA-Israel air war against Iran, the first set of missions were leadership decapitation strikes. The goal of decapitating Iranian leadership was the first task and the AD suppression or destruction missions were enablers. Last year in Op Sindoor, the IAF and Army’s first task was destruction of the identified terrorist camps. The IAF undertook stand-off air strikes on three in-depth locations and the Army using land-based missiles destroyed the remaining six. These air strikes were the first missions. Control of the air or air superiority missions commenced only when the confrontation escalated after Pak’s response. Further, let’s review some of our air operations in Indo-Pak wars to help reinforce this point.

The 1965 Indo-Pak war started with Pakistan launching an offensive in the Akhnoor-Chhamb sector. When asked how long it would take the IAF to provide air support to stem the offensive, the CAS, Air Mshl Arjan Singh famously promised air support “in an hour”. The first IAF missions were launched by dusk on that day itself to blunt the armour threat to Chhamb. These missions involved 26 aircraft comprising Vampires and Mysteres. IAF lost some of these aircraft when PAF responded by employing F-86 Sabres to stop these air support missions since IAF till then had not commenced its counter-air campaign . Air superiority missions followed much later. Nearly 36% of combat effort was dedicated to CAS and Offensive Air Support.

Similarly, in the 1971 war, immediate CAS missions were launched in the early hours of 4 Dec 1971 in support of 35 Bde in Hussainiwala by Su-7 fighters. Similar CAS missions were flown in DBN and Rajasthan area as well. About 11 Forward Air Controllers (FACs) to guide air strikes were positioned with One Corps when it moved into Shakargarh sector. In the East, 60% of the air effort was allocated for CAS ab initio, which increased to 100% after neutralizing PAF assets. Overall, nearly 80% of air effort was devoted to CAS and interdiction on both the fronts. The assumption that IAF focuses only on control of the air at the start of the war is therefore, unfounded.

Why Air Superiority?

Coming to the second aspect of the reasons for all air forces to attach importance to control of the air. The Persian Gulf War of 1991 is said to have provided the first glimpse of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). In this war General Norman Schwarzkopf was the CENTCOM Commander. He had reportedly written   after the war that, “At bottom, neither (Gen Colin) Powell nor I wanted a ground war”.  The first mission of airpower under General Schwarzkopf was to achieve air dominance and then the air forces went on to hammer the hapless Iraqi ground forces. The allied ground offensive that followed became a walkover. Surprisingly the Army CENTCOM Commander must have been aware of numerous controversies regarding air power that bedevil the relationship between the air forces and the Army. But he did not task air forces to first destroy the Iraqi military, but emphasised the need to achieve control of the air. Therein lies the essential nature of air superiority.

A contrary illustration that supports the primary focus on air superiority is from the Ukraine-Russia war .  The overwhelmingly powerful Russian air force was denied freedom of operation by the Ukrainian strategy of air denial, based on a layered AD command & control system, employing AI and very high levels of situational awareness. The Russian air force either did not attempt or was unable to break this stranglehold and thus couldn’t  provide the required support to its land forces. The land war slowly deteriorated into a high attrition, grinding struggle, bordering on a stalemate. Absence of control of air leads to inability of air forces to support own forces in the land war. This could prove problematic and may lead to a stalemate or defeat. This is the reason behind militaries prioritising control of the air missions.

Air Force’s  fight for control of the air is considered by many as chasing glamour and feel that the air effort would prove more effective if used in other roles.  This belief is a big fallacy when viewed against the historical evidence which reveals that air superiority is a war winning attribute. A detailed study was undertaken to determine the correlation between air superiority and battlefield outcomes. The study considered wars between 1932 and 2003. The findings were revealing. Approximately 79% of decisive battle wins were supported by air superiority. The table below provides results of the study.

The above findings clearly reveal why even Army commanders opt for air power to be employed for control of the air or air superiority missions.

We can approach the issue in another way by asking the question, “What if..?”  What would have been the outcome of a particular battle if the adversary had control of the air?  Let us examine this in respect of the  much-talked-about Battle of Longewala of the 1971 Indo-Pak War. Pakistan launched a brigade level armour thrust near Jaisalmer which caught the India forces by surprise. Only one company of the Punjab regiment opposed the thrust, which if successful would have threatened India’s rear areas. The company of Punjab regiment managed to hold on for the night. Early next morning IAF launched Hunters from Jaisalmer to attack  Pak armour. Over two days the Hunters destroyed nearly 37 tanks and many supporting vehicles. PAF was conspicuous by its absence. An intercepted (translated) SOS message from the Pak forces stated that, “The enemy air force was making life miserable. Forty of our equipment destroyed. Let alone advance further, even retreat has become difficult”.  The battle of Longewala was in fact over by 6^th of December as 37 tanks lay smouldering on the this stretch of the Thar desert.  If PAF had air superiority, the IAF aircraft would not have been able to attack without interference and the outcome could have been a setback.

Conclusion

The details and discussions clearly indicate that war time IAF’s operations are dictated by military objectives. The type and priority of missions to be undertaken are in accordance with the overall plan of operations. There is no set or predetermined sequence of operations and it is not necessary that the initial focus would always be on control of the air missions. The myth that air forces always chase the glamorous air combat or control of the air missions is unfounded and needs to be discarded. Secondly, history of warfare reveals that air superiority has proved an enabler of decisive victories in land wars. Theatre Commanders or Joint Force Commanders have on many occasions prioritized control of the air over other roles in major wars such as the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the Iraq War of 2003 and some others. It is therefore, quite natural for air forces across the world to give control of the air doctrinal priority. The myth that IAF’s stress on air superiority is unnecessary needs to be dispelled.

Let’s look beyond these controversies and rethink the enabling facets of IAF’s operations.  

---

NOTE - The views in the article are the author's personal views based on his study / research / experience.The maps and photographs are for symbolic representation only.