Breaking The Barriers:Theaterisation And The Future Of India’s Warfighting Doctrine

The debate on the pros and cons of theaterisation in the Indian military invariably shifts to acrimonious barbs and inter-service faceoffs (ahhhh-what do you know of army operations; or naval operations or how the AF operates). Not to forget the rather unjust comparisons to 'we are not the American military -our requirements are different '!

But let me hasten to add, it is appreciable that we do have a few officers in this forum who have a divergent view from what is propounded by their hierarchy as such. Bravo!! But then, is it really possible that a far reaching and revolutionary concept such as 'theaterisation' can ever be debated or introduced in the Indian military without a foundational earthquake?

I think not. So the question remains, is theaterisation a bad idea as far as 'Indian military requirements (and policy)' are concerned? Is there any merit in theaterisation? If it is such an unpractical and illogical proposal, why does the issue crop up again? And again. Do we take our past wars or Kargil or Sindoor or our personal 'experiences and practical knowledge' as bench-marks to substantiate whether the idea of theaterisation is absurd or a necessity?

So lets see as to why this idea keeps coming up?

Firstly, it would be extremely obtuse to state that there are no operational inefficiencies in our method of war fighting. The outcomes of past wars must be respected but not idolized. In today’s rapidly evolving combat environment, we must break from outdated doctrines. Our foundation for tactical and strategic military preparation must begin with the realities of modern warfare and there definitely is a need for more effective military preparedness that demands seamless coordination, integrated planning, and true interoperability among all our services — not just for a short skirmish but equally during peace or in a prolonged war or in the complex ‘no war, no peace’ scenarios.

Theaterisation (call it unified command if the word sounds offensive) is a crucial step in this direction, enabling unified command structures, optimized resource use, and faster more cohesive operational responses across all domains.

Secondly, we have to to accept that there is a duplication of resources in our tri-service functioning. Each service has its own logistics, training, communications, procurements et-al. Costly, redundant and avoidable.

Thirdly, modern warfare trends demand that in the employment of weapon systems; from aircrafts to drones to AFV's to submarines to missiles and artillery (field or airdefence) -   jointness is no longer optional. Information dominance, space, cyber, precision strikes, intelligence, choice of the 'delivery system', desired results; all demand one person sitting at the head of the table where the buck finally stops.

Fourthly, this insistence that we have finally achieved an acceptable level of jointness and integration is wishful thinking-  a bit of professional dis-honesty lurks in the background. Let us not trash what successive governments, especially the post-Kargil Review Committee and the Naresh Chandra Task Force, have pushed for-  jointness. There is more required, let us try and fight the next major war as a more cohesive machine. Sindoor is still shrouded in secrecy and it will be premature to draw definitive conclusions or to template our strengths and weaknesses based solely on such a constrained engagement. A broader and more sustained evaluation is essential to extract meaningful lessons and drive future capability development. And that is one of the reasons that the ‘push’ for a unified command system surfaces time and again.

Views differ, and I do appreciate the views of the naysayers. But theaterisation does have merit.

Overall command will be definitely better, requirement of 'crisis and coordination' meetings are obviated as one theater commander will have authority across all services. And he will always have competent advisers in the full picture as the situation unfolds.

Resource optimisation is inherent, pooling assets (air support, drones, radars, strike platforms, artillery, foot-soldiers, SF etc) prevents duplication of effort and wasteful resource utilisation for ‘targets’ not essential to the broader game plan. Not to forget that future wars being multi-domain as brought out in the earlier discussions in this very forum – Grey zone ops, cyber, space, electronic warfare, the depth battle, interdiction, isolation of the enemy by land, sea and air— all demand integration.

Forget service silos for some time for the sake of our discussion. Surely we all agree that to be always ahead of the enemy's OODA loop we need faster decision making – and reduced bureaucratic layering between services.

Finally, theaterisation will help in better civil-military synergy at the theater level and will also help in ease of dealing in their entire geographical areas by unified commanders with political leadership, in peace and in war.  A requirement many trivialize.

So if the idea is a good one, why this resistance?

Well, there are the service identities and doctrinal differences for one. The Army fights on land, Navy on sea, Air Force across depth. There is this inherent fear that one service’s view (usually the Army’s, given its size) will dominate.

Then there is the geographic vs functional problem specific to us. India’s threat matrix (two-front war + internal security) is unique. Unlike the USA, we cannot and we do not need to 'export' forces to distant theaters; our theaters overlap (China-Pak collusion). Here the demand for theaterisation becomes weak if that be the reason to object to the concept!.

Now lets come on to the Air Force’s concern – the IAF insists it is a strategic force, not an 'air artillery' to be parcelled out piecemeal to each theatre commander. Add to this the unspoken but real bureaucratic rivalries.  Promotions, turf, control of budgets etc.

No service wants to be a junior partner.

And we have another caution here. Implementation Risks! Poorly thought-out theaterisation could worsen our battle efficiency rather than honing it.

We need to accept that theaterisation is not just a structural reform, it is infact an existential reform. It will affect career paths (who becomes a theater commander?), it will affect doctrinal autonomy (who writes 'the way we fight'?). It will give rise to the relative power equation between services (Army-heavy model vs Air/Navy balance).

My dear sirs, this is why the debate quickly degenerates into inter-service barbs and 'we are not America/China' arguments.

The real benchmark for deciding on the need for theaterisation  should be future wars — cyber attacks, space denial, swarm drones, long-range precision strikes, isolation and interdiction of the enemy nation, destruction of its civilian and military infrastructure by bearing our max available coordinated combat power. Shock and awe if you may.

None of which can be brought to bear by one service alone.

To conclude,  we must accept that theaterisation will not be a smooth, evolutionary change for us. And because it threatens entrenched service cultures and bureaucratic hierarchies, it feels like an earthquake.

For us, a phased approach may be more pragmatic. Lets start with successful functional commands for which work is already in progress (Air Defence, Cyber, Space). And then move to geographic theatres once trust builds. Theaterisation definitely is not an absurd idea; it is almost inevitable if India wants credible joint warfighting in the 21st century. The question is not whether but how — and whether the transition is managed as phased reform or forced revolution.