The Limits of Air Power ; Implications for theatre-isation -- By Gp Capt TP Srivastava

Date;- 28 August 2026

An article with above headlines authored by an eminent soldier appeared in print a few days back. The three star officer, who expressed his views based on bits and pieces gathered from ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. Surprisingly the author did not take note of Israeli Air offensive since 7th October, 2022 for reasons best known to him.

Contents of author’s concluding para are as vague as any unsubstantiated and biased view can be on matters about which one has little professional knowledge. Author states;

“None of this is a case against the IAF. It is a case against testing the IAF’s convictions in a crisis, when there may be no second chance.”

Conflicting statements in succeeding sentences! Since the author has mentioned about the conviction of IAF, may I remind the author that Kargil crisis was a result of poor surveillance by Army over at least two winters prior to 1999 summer, when the issue came out into the open. The then CoAS was not willing to share the facts with CAS as to why requirement of Attack Helicopters to operate at or near line of control was projected. With Kargil burning the CoAS continued with his prior planned Poland visit. IAF’s conviction married with competence and capability ensured that pin point targeting in those altitudes was done with unbelievable accuracy. No Air Power in the world has ever achieved such distinction till date. That is IAF’s conviction.

Nearer times the IAF’s concentrated onslaught on Paki targets deep inside its territory brought them to their knees in less than 100 hours during Op Sindoor. The onslaught impact was so severe that it forced Pak PM to fly to Washington unannounced on 4th July, 1999 (4th July is US Independence Day) and ‘beg’ US President to ‘stop’ IAF offensive. That is IAF’s conviction.

We in the blues are groomed under actual conditions. ‘Blues’ do not validate their precepts and capabilities in sand model rooms or charts. Facts are :

· -IAF transport fleet carries out strategic airlift as a matter of routine. Entire Ladakh region, where the author commanded the Corps is supported by equipment, Ration and other materials brought in by IAF transport fleet on daily basis. For records; IAF Transport fleet lifts more tonnage every year, which is more than the entire tonnage lifted by allied forces during Berlin Airlift.

· - IAF Transport fleet regularly operates to and from ‘POSTAGE STAMP’ sized airfields viz ANINI, ALINI, TEZU, VIJAYNAGAR etc in north east. No Air Power in the world operates from such hostile airfields.

· - None of the airlift/drops are done in sand model rooms.

· IAF Helicopter fleet ensured that Siachen base camp was equipped with whatever was required, when Siachen crisis took place. Indeed valiant air warriors of Army Aviation have also joined the task. Helicopters operate at these insane heights at the limit of engine power.

· - IAF Fighter pilots carry out live attacks under operational conditions as a matter of routine training viz flying at 30 meter at speeds in excess of 900 kmph and drop the ordnance on targets even during pitch dark night. Each drop is measured to within meters. They do not carry out simulated weapon training in sand model rooms. IAF does not simulate a troop of three tanks as entire Armoured Brigade. As a matter of routine IAF fighter squadrons practice 16 ac saturated strikes over targets.

That is IAF’s conviction, capability, competence, commitment and training.

Author has made a valid point while enunciating his views on Air Defence issues. Let it be stated unequivocally that the term ‘AIR SUPERIORITY’ is no longer valid in practice. Any Air Defence network can and will be penetrated as should be quite evident from the ongoing wars in two different regions. In spite of systems viz THAAD, IRON DOME, PATRIOT, S-400, S-300 (list is endless) a determined manned fighter and/or SSM will be able to penetrate. Indeed there would be losses.

Air Defence network of the IAF has proved its potency by successfully engaging an incoming Paki SSM during Op Sindoor. Of course a saturated SSM strike cannot/will not be destroyed in totality irrespective of whether such strike is a multi radial or single radial strike. With limited Air Defence resources IAF has created an effective Air Defence network around most VAs/VPs. Drawing lessons from Ukraine war may not be professionally sound in our scenario.

Hence Air Defence network limitations is not IAF limitation. It is for all Air Forces in the world. Suffice to conclude that no combination of radars, missiles and early warning systems can prevent a weapon from penetrating and reaching the target.

Author has commanded a corps in Ladakh region. It is, therefore, expected that author would know PLAAF (Chinese Army Air Force) capability better than air warriors. Author ought to know that PLAAF cannot effectively operate from airfields located in Tibet Autonomous Region primarily because of high altitude at which they are located. Flying machines and human beings behave in identical manner at high altitude; both ‘puff’ and ‘pant’. Weapon carrying capability drops markedly. Normal operations viz take off and landing require super-precision with no room for error.

In brief; it would suffice to mention that IAF has 16 fully operational airfields Bareilly eastward facing China. Most airfields are at or close to sea level. In J&K IAF has Jammu, Udhampur, Srinagar, Avantipura, Leh, Thoise which are fit for fighter operations. In contrast PLAAF has only two airfields with elevation around 1500 meter (nearly same as Srinagar). Rest of the airfields are located at 3000 meter and more. For a layman it would suffice to mention that one pair of Main Wheel tyre, which might last for 50 landings at sea level airfield but at an airfield with elevation 3000 metre only FIVE landings will require a change. Ice Accretion on runway during winter months (Sep to March), strong surface winds, sub zero ambient temperatures accompanied by fog and gray skies does not/will not allow PLAAF to carry out sustained operation, both fixed and rotary wings.

Chinese muted response after our full scale deployment post Doklam/Galwan is a clear indicator that PLAAF understands insurmountable limitations imposed on its operations due to terrain.

As is the wont by members of senior service, the author has followed same track by attempting to ‘blame’ IAF for its views on professionally unsound, unwanted and undesirable proposal of Theatre Commands. It is six years and counting, the proponents/supporter of poorly conceived Theatre Command proposal have failed to convince the ‘powers that be’ to tear the existing war winning structure of the Military: the regional commands and replace it with Theatre Commands.

Finally, I still wait for clear answer to five questions I raised in March, 2020 within a few days after the first CDS floated ill conceived idea overnight. Only first question is mentioned below;

“Kindly mention specific instance during HOT WAR conditions, where any perceived non-cooperation from IAF RESULTED IN ADVERSITY”.

Answer awaited.

Change for the sake of change is not desirable, which has been copied from US War College précis. No war can be won by a single service. Mutual Inter-Dependence and trust will ensure victory as has happened so far. As a professional air warrior I do not wish to mention/discuss about limitation of sister services. It is for them to analyse and appreciate. We as air warriors of IAF are groomed to believe that our colleagues in Olive Greens and Whites are the best soldiers of any military.