INDIAN SECURITY FORCES (SERVICES & CAPF FOR DEFENCE & INTERNAL SECURITY ) NEED REVIEW & REFORMS FOR IMPERATIVE NATIONAL NEEDS OF 21ST CENTURY WARFARE --'By Brig Pradeep Sharma

Date:- 11th April 2026

EDITOR'S NOTE

This timely and relevant article by Brig Pradeep Sharma is on a very serious , thought provoking and highly debatable subject . All the intricately linked issues concerning the SERVICES and CAPF need to be deliberated and debated at the national level in the highest national interest of India ! We cannot any longer continue to fight 21st century warfare with structural and functional organisations of the 20th century !

Let's debate!

Col Vinay B Dalvi

Editor , MVI

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INTRODUCTION

For ages our security architecture has rested on two pillars: The MOD with the three Services of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force) including operational control over the Assam Rifles on one and the MHA with Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) — BSF, CRPF, ITBP, CISF, SSB, and others — under the Ministry of Home Affairs. An admixture of border management, internal security and disaster management being an area resting with the MHA but more often than not ending up in a joint effort. Together the numbers are approximately 20 lakh personnel who shoulder the twin burden of external defense and internal security.

While the professionalism and sacrifices of each organisation must be acknowledged, one must admit that the entire edifice suffers from deep structural flaws rooted in constitutional ambiguity, outdated organisational logic and institutional turf wars. With major structural changes in the offing for Armed Forces being propelled by the changing security requirements is it time for bold, role-based reforms that prioritize functional efficiency over bureaucratic convenience? Let us debate.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMBIGUITY: IS IT A RECIPE FOR CONFUSION?

Constitution has not defined these expressions or drawn a clear line between the regular Armed Forces and the CAPF. As can be seen in Entry 2 of Union List it says “Naval, military and air forces; any other armed forces of the Union” and uses the very same phrase “Armed Forces of the Union” later in the BSF Act, CRPF Act and other CAPF statutes to describe forces which are placed under the Ministry of Home Affairs. When it comes to defining the nation’s armed forces organizations as is evident by the use of interchangeable and undefined terms across different articles and entries as given below:-

a) “Defence Forces”

b)“Armed Forces”

c)“Military”

d) “Other Armed Forces of the Union”

Thus, it not only creates legal and administrative confusion but also leaves much to be desired in managing our borders, the Galwan episode is a case in point.

In practice, it allows CAPF to be treated sometimes as “military” (when it suits operational deployment) and sometimes as “police” (when it suits service conditions and control). The result is a grey zone where accountability, command and control remain perpetually contested.

WHAT DRIVES THE STRUCTURAL DESIGN? CADRE MANAGEMENT OR FUNCTIONAL NEED?

Apparently, and as evidenced by the recent passing of the CAPF Bill they are structured to create promotional avenues for the Indian Police Service (IPS) and Not according to professional and operational requirements.

Surprisingly , the officer cadre of the security forces continues to present three-types of hierarchy unparalleld in any modern democracy:-

a) Commissioned Officers of the three Services.

b). CAPF Group-A Officers recruited directly through the UPSC (Assistant Commandants and above).

c). Police Officers (IPS) — the “All-India Service” cadre that occupies almost all senior command and staff appointments in CAPF.

Although the Constitution and statutes never use the word “elite”, the IPS cadre has, in practice, positioned itself as superior to both CAPF Group-A officers and Commissioned Officers of the Armed Forces by drawing parity. It has been institutionalised through cadre reviews, deputation rules and inter-service equations that consistently favour IPS officers. The result is a demoralising two-class officer structure within the same uniform: one set trained and oriented for combat and border management, the other oriented towards civil administration and cadre management.

ABSENCE OF ROLE-BASED ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

Logical role-based division is conspicuous by its absence. Forces that are required to operate in close tactical coordination with the Army — such as the Border Security Force (BSF) and Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) — continue to be con trolled by the MHA rather than the Ministry of Defence. The chain of reporting of various Intelligence agencies too is routed through the MHA at the cost of operational efficiency. The tussle for control of the Assam Rifles , the only Para Mil Force crops up every now and then.

Forces whose primary charter is internal security and law-and-order assistance — such as the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) — should continue under the Ministry of Home Affairs. One could attributed two historical factors:-

a)The lingering “coup phobia” that has haunted civil-military relations since Independence.

b) The powerful lobby of the IPS, which sees CAPF as its extended cadre empire.

Operational costs of this administrative mismatch range from Pay and Allowance disparities between Army and BSF/ITBP troops deployed on the same border creating heartburn and affecting morale. Command-and-Control is repeatedly contested during joint operations. Procurement, training, infrastructure and logistics remain fragmented. In short, the country is paying a heavy price in efficiency for preserving an outdated bureaucratic arrangement.

THE WAY FORWARD: TIME FOR STRUCTURAL REFORMS

The creation of a Integrated Head Quarters headed by a CDS has to a limited extent streamlined the channel of command, however, the ambiguity created by Constitutional Definition continues to plague the security set up, hence the need for a comprehensive structural reform package is now an operational and administrative necessity. The following elements should form its core:-

Constitutional Clarification: The term “Armed Forces of the Union” requires clarification through a Constitutional Amendment or a Parliamentory Legislation if need be. Nothing short of this can be meaningful or effective.

The Status of “Defence Forces” and CAPF must be distinct , so also their respective roles, control mechanisms and inter-se relationship.

Role-Based Ministry Control would clearly favour the transfer BSF and ITBP (and Assam Rifles) to the Ministry of Defence while retaining CRPF, CISF and others under the Ministry of Home Affairs. This single step will eliminate duplication, align doctrine with deployment and remove pay-related anomalies.

Unified Officer Cadre Management: Create a single, merit-based promotion and command structure for CAPF that respects the functional distinction between combat-oriented leadership and civil-police administration. IPS deputation to CAPF should be limited to advisory or staff roles rather than operational command.

Functional Integration with Defence Forces needs to be examined and with the aim of establishing permanent joint structures for:-

Border management, training, logistics and intelligence so that forces fighting shoulder-to-shoulder on the LAC or LoC do not suffer from two different service rules.

Pay commissions and administrative bosses so that anomalies of various pay related issues are removed.

Professional Independence and insulation from cadre politics and “coup phobia” should be the guiding principle for adopting a structure which is best suited for operational performance and national security?

FINAL WORD

The men and women in uniform — whether in olive green, khaki or blue-grey — deserve a system that values their role, respects their professionalism and maximizes their efficiency.

The Nation and its Security forces should not fight modern wars with an antique and fossilized organisational architecture. Thus structural reform is not an option; it is a national imperative. The Union Government must summon the political will to carry out these long-overdue changes before the next security crisis exposes the fault lines that we have chosen to ignore for far too long. The security of 1.4 billion Indians demands nothing less.