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Analyses of Communications and Narrative Shaping during Op Sindoor

  • Writer: Gp Capt PK Mulay, VM (Retd)
    Gp Capt PK Mulay, VM (Retd)
  • Aug 8
  • 8 min read

“Our inherent cognitive biases make us ripe for manipulation and exploitation by those who have an agenda to push, especially if they can discredit all other sources of information.”

                                                                                                       Lee McIntyre, Post Truth

 

Background


Welcome to the post-truth era, where contemporary political and social discourse is characterized by disinformation and disregard for truth. When even a person occupying a high office, such as Donald Trump, makes many false or misleading statements every day, fake news or misinformation tends to get normalized. Quite surprisingly, false news tends to stick in the minds of people and is difficult to dislodge. In the post-truth world, emotions, rather than facts, shape an individual or a group’s perception of truth. Simply stated, people believe in news that fits their beliefs and emotions.

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The other reality is that facts by themselves carry no story. The story or narrative emerges when facts are woven into a thread to reflect an opinion. Narrators may include only facts or data that align with their own opinions and leave out disagreeable facts. This is what leads to biased or manipulated opinion pieces. Thus, innumerable narratives emerge from the same set of facts, and followers tend to believe stories that are in line with their prior beliefs and emotions. This is how the war of narratives commences: the side that is first to present its version gains the first-mover advantage, irrespective of authenticity.


Communication Issues During Op Sindoor


With the above as the backdrop, one can easily understand the war of narratives and disinformation that characterized Op Sindoor. India’s communication and narrative shaping came in for severe criticism during Op Sindoor. The criticism was about the delays in making public the details of the operations, which gave Pakistani influencers a head start of 10-12 hours.  This created a vacuum that was filled by manipulated narratives focusing on unverified Indian losses on the first night. This story overshadowed IAF’s spectacular air strikes and the unchallenged air domination over Pakistani skies. Did the Pak narrative leave out disagreeable facts?


Now

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that the dust has settled, it would be worthwhile examining whether the criticism is justified and identifying weaknesses, if any. Another interesting aspect would be to ascertain if the so-called “Pak’s narrative domination” of the initial days of Op Sindoor survived battlefield realities and the passage of time.


Facets of Wartime Communication


There are two facets of communications during wartime: one is strategic communication, which falls largely in the government’s domain, and the other is narrative shaping, undertaken by government agencies, sponsored media outlets, and social media influencers and subscribers.


Strategic Communication During Op Sindoor


Strategic communication involves the government’s activities that support military operations. The means encompass military briefings, press releases, statements by leaders, actions, imagery, and symbols to influence key stakeholders in support of the operations. After the Pahalgam killings, Indian leaders, including the PM, highlighted the dastardly nature of the terror attacks and announced the intent to retaliate. The aim was to unite the people behind the government’s intent, as well as seek the support of other countries.

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Subsequently, when kinetic activities commenced, actions and telecalls were means to communicate intent. The attacks on only terror-related locations on the night of 6/7 May were followed by a call by India’s DGMO to his Pakistani counterpart, conveying India’s restraint and escalation avoidance. Pak either did not appreciate India’s intent or ignored it since the attacks crossed its red lines. Pak attempted to attack Indian targets on the following night. This was understood by India as Pakistan’s intent to escalate. Indian attacks on the following two nights signaled its objective to dominate escalation. Precision and heavy air attacks on Noor Khan, Sargodha, and other main Pakistani airbases signaled India’s willingness to raise the stakes. This resulted in Pak DGMO calling for a ceasefire. Strategic communication between the Indian and Pak military was through actions and telephone calls. Communications of the Indian military were forthright and unambiguous.


After Op Sindoor was paused, India’s PM addressed the nation and very clearly enunciated India’s future approach to terror attacks, communicating India’s redlines, dismissing non-attributability of Pak in terror attacks, and calling out Pak’s nuclear bluff. The address communicated India’s redlines and policies to Pakistan’s leadership, its Army, and other countries. There can be little confusion or doubt about India’s intentions after this address. This strategic political signaling was crystal clear.

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Briefings were held by the Indian military providing information on the outcome of operations. The briefings provided details of Indian air and missile attacks, along with satellite or drone images of impact and damage. This left little room for doubt about the extent of damage and the effectiveness of Indian attacks. The only aspect on which the military briefings were evasive was on the losses, both Indian and Pakistani, except to state that losses are part of any operation, and all Indian pilots were safe and back home. In a media interaction in Singapore, CDS admitted to initial losses due to tactical mistakes.  The admission of mistake to the world media does appear ill-judged. Other officials also repeated the story of losses. This emphasis on losses was surprising since losses are hardly ever disclosed during operations by any military for reasons linked to confidentiality and morale.

Truthfulness has its place in internal inquiries, but such an admission of error fueled speculation and unwanted narratives. Global and social media latched on to this statement, and the focus shifted onto platforms such as Rafale, J-10 C, and PL-18E AA Missile. The platforms and unverified Indian losses gained more attention than the objectives and overall outcome of operations. Social media was replete with stories of Pak’s air superiority even as its AD systems and air bases were being devastated by IAF air strikes, without even a semblance of resistance by the PAF.


Regarding mistakes on the first night, Helmuth von Moltke’s quote may shed some light. He had said, “No war plan survives contact with the enemy”. This truism indicates that there was nothing unusual about India’s tactics of the first night requiring recalibration. The devastation heaped on Pak military assets on the subsequent two nights confirmed India’s ability to adapt and recalibrate its strategy to come out on top.

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The conflicting and ill-timed statements by senior officials indicated that the consequences of official statements were not fully thought through. Lack of coordination among the military staff and other agencies was also obvious. This points towards a need for better coordination and a clear strategic communication policy.  


Narrative Shaping


On the issue of narrative building, India did appear to be on the back foot. Pak’s ISPR has, over the years, cultivated the Western press and influential social media handles. Global media such as the NYT, Washington Post, and The Guardian, among others, are always overtly sympathetic towards Pakistan in any confrontation. The delays in information from Indian officials and the unverified Indian losses resulted in ISPR, its handles, and the Western media labeling India as the aggressor and Pakistan as the victim. Twisted news of civilian casualties during strikes on terror infrastructure, PAF’s superior air combat capabilities against a stronger military, and Pakistan’s air superiority reverberated on social and news media. False claims about Pak air strikes on Srinagar and many other airbases were highlighted. The reality of the remarkable pummeling of Pak’s military assets got muted and showed up India’s narrative control in poor light.


While the initial narratives and news were tilted in Pak’s favour, as the operation progressed, Indian briefings became more forthcoming and included satellite imagery of the extensive damage. This tended to correct the bias. But misinformation is very sticky, and Pakistan’s earlier misinformation continued to grab eyes and ears for quite some time, even after the

ceasefire.

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ISPR, known social media handles, and foreign press were the bullhorns of Pak’s narrative. The full-throated Indian news and TV media could not counter the narratives since it had lost some credibility when it started showing false videos of Indian attacks on Karachi port, and discussed at length the mutinies in the Pakistani army. Dedicated social media handles were absent to shape the Indian narrative, and isolated individual posts were reactive and were overpowered by Pak proxies. The surprising aspect is that India has many think tanks dedicated to security issues, and some are patronized, funded, and guided by the services themselves. Their silence was noticeable when none countered Western analysts parroting the Pakistani narrative. Silence in such situations is taken as acceptance of the narrative.


It is surprising that with such a vociferous media, agencies associated with the military and innumerable veterans active on social media, India was confronted with Pakistan dominating the war of narrative in the first few days. Leave aside Pakistan, the Western media is very partial to China and does not publish any news stories that may embarrass it. The intention is not to spread misinformation or false stories, but to put forth authentic information to correct the bias. One acknowledges that India is a democracy and may not be able to create propaganda outlets such as the Global Times and ISPR.


The experience of narrative shaping from Op Sindoor does point towards the need for creating a mechanism for quick and credible narrative building with the support of credible media outlets, supporting agencies, and influential veteran social media handles. The innumerable hyperactive Indian social media subscribers can then easily amplify the narrative.

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Can Pak Narrative Survive?


Finally, it would be worth ascertaining if Pak’s narrative shaping survived after a few months. In this regard, the Ukraine-Russia war may be illustrative. At the start of the war, the main news providers, Reuters, AP, and AFP, banned Russian news broadcasts. Only a one-sided, Western version of news was provided across the world. Videos such as “Ghost of Kiev” went viral, depicting a Ukrainian MiG-29 shooting down innumerable Russian fighters. The video turned out to be false. Even today, news emerging about the war continues to be one-sided, showcasing Ukrainian heroism and resistance. However, all these narratives cannot hide the fact that Russia is today in occupation of over 20% of Ukrainian territory, with a negligible chance of Ukraine regaining even a minuscule portion. Narrative shaping sounds very good and enthrals followers for some time. But ultimately, reality cannot be brushed aside. The cliché, “Shaping the narrative is as important as shaping the battlefield,” remains what it is: a cliché. Stories have to ultimately yield to reality.


The same has happened in the case of Op Sindoor. The bull horns supporting Pak narratives have quietened, and the stray posts proclaiming Pak air superiority are countered with facts. Ambiguity about Indian losses remains, but appears purposeful, to keep adversaries unbalanced. Western think tanks such as RUSI and others have accepted Indian dominance and commended the exceptionally crafted and controlled punitive strategy. Reality seems to have doused the flames of false narratives.

 

Conclusion


Indian strategic communication managed to convey the message to Pakistan, its Army, and other stakeholders. However, a more nuanced communication policy and centralized briefings and disclosures need to be thought of. On narrative building, India needs to get its act together, to create a mechanism to project its narrative quickly and credibly. This would prove beneficial as a rising India faces turbulent times, particularly when dealing when confrontations in the grey zone. Improved narrative shaping would prove to be an added advantage as India moves forward and climbs the global power hierarchy.


Author’s Byline

Gp Capt PK Mulay, VM (Retd), is a test pilot and has commanded an Attack Helicopter Sqn.  He has a PhD in Defence Studies.    

2 Comments


Guest
Aug 08

As sharp as ever sir! Excellent analysis, and very balanced!

More power to your pen!!

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Ashish
Aug 08

Very well analyzed sir

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