AGNIPATH SCHEME: AN UNNECESSARY EXPERIMENT IN THE NAME OF MILITARY REFORM AND A FAILURE OF POLICY -Brig Sarvesh Dutt Dangwal (Veteran)

On 4 November 2026, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), during a press briefing, announced that the Union Cabinet had approved amendments to the Agnipath Scheme.

Under the proposed arrangement, the 75 per cent of Agniveers who are not absorbed into regular military service after completing their initial four-year tenure will be granted an additional two years of service. Thereafter, their suitability for regular absorption will be assessed on the basis of their willingness, qualifications, discipline, capabilities and physical fitness.

At first glance, this may appear to be a welcome relief for the Agniveers.

But it raises a much more fundamental question:

Why does a scheme, introduced in June 2022 and projected as a historic and revolutionary military reform, require substantial modifications within barely four years of its implementation?

Does this not suggest that the government introduced a fundamentally disruptive arrangement without adequate professional military deliberation, institutional consensus or scientific assessment of its long-term implications?

My position is clear.

There was certainly a need to modernise and reform the Indian Army. But there was no demonstrated military necessity for introducing a short-term recruitment model like Agnipath and dismantling the established system of regular soldier recruitment in the manner that was done. The stated benefits of the bombastic sounding Agnipath Yojna 1.0 have all been renounced by the Agnipath Yojna 2.0.

There were several ways to rejuvenate the Army's age profile, improve physical standards, modernise training and integrate emerging technologies without fundamentally altering its traditional manpower structure.

Why, then, was this radical departure considered necessary?

The government had argued that Agnipath would reduce the average age of the Army from approximately 32 to 26 years, provide a younger and fitter force and substantially reduce the burden of defence pensions.

But I ask:

Does reducing the average age of the Army automatically translate into greater combat effectiveness?

Are wars won merely by having younger bodies in uniform?

Military modernisation—including equipment, technology absorption, integration, doctrine and training—depends not merely on physical fitness, but equally on experience, professional competence, mental resilience, leadership, sound judgement and battlefield adaptability.

An experienced soldier develops an understanding of his unit, weapons, operational environment and the realities of warfare over years of service.

Such experience cannot be fully acquired in four years.

A young Army is desirable, but an Army without adequate experience is an incomplete fighting force.

Now consider the government's latest amendment.

Initially, four years were declared sufficient. At the end of that period, 75 per cent of the Agniveers were to leave military service. Now, the same personnel are being offered an additional two years.

My question is straightforward:

If four years were sufficient, what was the military rationale for introducing a further two-year extension?

And if six years are required to assess a soldier's suitability and potential more effectively, what was the justification for fixing the original tenure at four years?

Furthermore, if regular absorption is still not guaranteed after six years, how does this amendment provide a lasting solution to the uncertainty surrounding the Agniveers' future?

Is this genuine military reform, or merely another attempt to paper over the shortcomings of the government's original policy?

To me, this reflects policy stubbornness and a serious lack of foresight.

The government first imposed a fundamentally new recruitment arrangement. Having encountered the difficulties arising from it, it now appears to be introducing successive modifications to address the consequences of its own decision.

There is another important dimension that deserves attention.

While never explicitly stated as its principal objective, the reduction of the growing defence pension burden was an unmistakable underlying financial rationale behind the Agnipath Scheme.

But is it appropriate to view a soldier's regular service and pension merely as a financial liability?

The training, experience and professional competence accumulated by a soldier constitute a strategic national asset, not an avoidable expenditure.

No matter how sophisticated modern weapons, drones, artificial intelligence and other technologies become, the importance of a trained and experienced soldier on the battlefield cannot be diminished.

Let me make one thing absolutely clear.

My concern extends beyond the employment prospects of Agniveers. They deserve fairness, dignity and justice. The government has a moral, institutional and constitutional obligation to safeguard their future through meaningful rehabilitation and assured social and economic security. More fundamentally, the Agnipath Scheme raises serious questions of equality and equal treatment, as it creates a distinct and unequal category of military personnel performing duties within the same armed forces, but under substantially different terms and conditions of service.

But an even larger question concerns the future of the Indian Army itself.

The government must now answer some fundamental questions:

What was the compelling military necessity for introducing the Agnipath Scheme in the first place?

What scientific, professional and operational assessment justified fixing the initial service tenure at four years?

To what extent has the scheme actually enhanced the Army's combat effectiveness, and what has been its impact on the availability of experienced personnel?

How do the savings in pension expenditure compare with the actual costs of recruitment, training, retraining and the frequent replacement of personnel?

These questions cannot be answered through political publicity or administrative assertions. They require an independent, professional and evidence-based military assessment.

I therefore demand a comprehensive review of the original concept of Agnipath, involving former Chiefs of the Services, experienced military commanders, defence analysts and training specialists. The findings, while protecting operationally sensitive information, must be made available to the nation.

Let me conclude with one simple but important observation.

The armed forces are not a laboratory in which governments can introduce experimental policies at their convenience, put the future of soldiers at stake and then keep modifying the arrangements whenever shortcomings become evident.

Military reform does not simply mean reducing the average age of the Army or cutting pension expenditure.

Genuine military reform means building a force that is better trained, more experienced, technologically advanced, professionally competent and more effective under actual combat conditions.

Do justice to the Agniveers.

But do not compromise the traditions, institutional experience and combat effectiveness of the Indian Armed Forces.

The question today is not what further amendment has been made to Agnipath. The real question is: why was a scheme, whose fundamental military necessity was never convincingly established, imposed upon the nation's armed forces in the first place?

Among many seasoned veterans, Agnipath 2.0 is widely perceived as an opportunistic populist exercise—a politically motivated attempt by the ruling dispensation to salvage its credibility and reap electoral dividends in the forthcoming Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Uttarakhand, rather than a genuine military reform driven by operational necessity.

The government owes the nation an honest answer!

ADDENDUM TO ARTICLE : CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY & FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF AGNIPATH SCHEME SOLDIER -

Agnipath 1.0 and 2.0: A Question of Constitutional Equality and the Fundamental Rights of a Soldier

The Agnipath Scheme, both in its original 2022 formulation and its revised two-year extension, raises a serious constitutional question concerning the Right to Equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. An Agniveer serving under the extended six-year arrangement may find himself performing substantially identical military duties alongside a regular soldier, under the same command, discipline, operational conditions and life-threatening circumstances. Both are entrusted with the defence of the nation; both are exposed to hostile fire, extreme terrain, operational hazards and the possibility of the ultimate sacrifice. Yet, merely because of their recruitment category, they may be subjected to substantially different remuneration structures, service entitlements, career opportunities and post-service welfare provisions. This raises a fundamental question: can the State demand equality of duty, responsibility, discipline and sacrifice while institutionalising inequality in the corresponding rights and protections of those who serve? Article 14 permits reasonable classification, but such classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia and bear a rational nexus with the objective sought to be achieved.

A contractual distinction in recruitment cannot, by itself, provide an unquestionable constitutional justification for denying comparable treatment in matters intrinsically connected with identical military duties and operational risks.

The principles underlying Articles 16 and 21 further reinforce the requirement of fairness, dignity and protection in public service. Admittedly, differences in qualifying service, tenure and career structure may justify certain distinctions, particularly in pension and retirement benefits. However, they cannot automatically justify unequal treatment in operational allowances, medical protection, disability compensation, death benefits and other safeguards arising from military service. The State's obligation towards a soldier cannot be confined to the terms of his recruitment contract, particularly when it deploys him in circumstances involving the gravest risks to human life. The enemy does not distinguish between a regular soldier and an Agniveer; a bullet does not recognise their contractual status. The constitutional issue, therefore, is not a demand for indiscriminate parity in every service benefit, but for equality, fairness and proportionate protection wherever duties, responsibilities and risks are substantially comparable.

To deny such protection without a demonstrably reasonable and constitutionally sustainable justification would raise a serious question of arbitrariness under Article 14 and potentially undermine the dignity and protection contemplated under Article 21. The Republic cannot demand an equal willingness to die for the nation while treating the rights and entitlements of those who defend it as unequal by default.

In essence:

Article 14: Equality, fairness and protection against arbitrary State action.

Article 21: Protection of life, liberty and human dignity.

Both are fundamental constitutional guarantees applicable to every person, including serving soldiers and Agniveers.

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NOTE - The contents of this article contains the author's personal views based on his study , research and experience of the subject and linked issues .The pictures are for symbolic representation only .