Agnipath Scheme: A Reform Requiring Careful Assessment- Col NN Bhatia (Retd)

Date:- 06 November 2026

The Agnipath scheme was introduced in 2022 with the objective of creating a younger, fitter and more technologically adaptable Armed Forces while reducing the long-term manpower and pension burden. Under the scheme, Agniveers serve for four years, with up to 25 per cent of each batch being retained in the regular cadre. The remaining personnel leave with a financial package and are expected to transition to civilian employment, including opportunities in the Central Armed Police Forces, State Police, Home Guard and other government and private-sector organisations.

Whether the scheme will ultimately prove a success or failure, however, is too early to determine. The first batch of Agniveers has now completed its four-year engagement, and its actual impact on combat effectiveness, unit cohesiveness, discipline, morale and manpower management will become clearer over the coming years.

Feedback from the field presents a mixed picture. Some Commanding Officers (COs) have expressed the view that the scheme could become considerably more effective if the retention rate were increased from 25 per cent to around 50–60 per cent. Higher retention would preserve more trained and experienced personnel within the Army and strengthen unit cohesiveness and combat effectiveness. A four-year tenure may otherwise result in the Services losing personnel just when they begin acquiring valuable operational experience and proficiency in their trades.

There are also field-level concerns regarding the quality and motivation of some batches, willingness to undertake demanding operational duties and the effect of uncertainty over permanent absorption on discipline and morale. Such observations, however, should be treated as field-level feedback rather than generalised to all Agniveers. The scheme should be assessed through objective data covering training standards, operational performance, disciplinary record, physical fitness, morale, retention, unit cohesiveness and combat effectiveness.

Another important issue is whether the training period and training content are adequate for the roles and weapons that Agniveers are expected to handle. Modern warfare increasingly requires soldiers to operate sophisticated communications, drones, surveillance systems, precision weapons, other technology-intensive equipment and cyber warfare. The emphasis must therefore be on ensuring that shorter service does not result in inadequate training or insufficient time to develop operational competence.

The fundamental question is also whether a fighting unit should contain two categories of soldiers—those pursuing a long-term military career and those serving for only four years with a limited prospect of retention. The distinction can affect career expectations, motivation and regimental bonding. The traditional strength of the Indian Armed Forces has rested not merely on youth and physical fitness but also on experience, discipline, unit cohesiveness, leadership and the regimental ethos. Any manpower reform must preserve these attributes.

An associated issue that merits serious consideration is the assimilation of Agniveers not retained in the Armed Forces into other uniformed security organisations, including the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs), Coast Guard and Assam Rifles. Some senior officers in the CPOs have reportedly expressed reservations about the automatic assimilation of the Agniveers who are not retained in the Armed Forces, raising the question whether personnel not selected for permanent military service should necessarily be inducted into the CPOs/ CAPFs. At the same time, the Government has sought to make such post-service employment avenues an important component of the Agnipath scheme. This raises a legitimate policy question: if Agniveers are considered adequately trained, disciplined and fit to serve in the Armed Forces for four years, how should their suitability for employment in other uniformed security organisations be assessed after they leave? The real test of the Agnipath scheme is therefore not merely whether the 25 per cent retained in the Armed Forces perform well, but also whether the remaining Agniveers can be productively utilised after four years rather than becoming a pool of trained but unemployed young men vulnerable to criminal activities. The recent decision to increase reservation for ex-Agniveers in the CPOs/CAPFs, Coast Guard and Assam Rifles from the earlier 10 per cent to 50 per cent is a significant step towards creating such job opportunities.

There is also a wider strategic dimension that deserves careful consideration: the impact of the Agnipath scheme on the recruitment of Gorkhas from Nepal. The Gorkhas have a long and distinguished history of service in the Indian Army and have traditionally been valued for their courage, discipline, loyalty and battlefield effectiveness. Due to poverty and unemployment in Nepal, this valuable human resource is vulnerable to enrolment by our adversaries, thus potentially jeopardising India's national interest, bilateral friendly relations with a neighbouring country and national security. The implications of any substantial change in Gorkha recruitment therefore extend beyond manpower management and deserve consideration from the perspective of India's wider strategic and diplomatic interests and good neighbourly relations with Nepal.

The Agnipath scheme should therefore be regarded as a major manpower reform requiring continuous evaluation and mid-course correction rather than being prematurely labelled either a success or a failure. Increasing retention, wherever operationally justified, reviewing training and service conditions, strengthening post-service employment avenues and ensuring that Agniveers serving alongside regular soldiers remain equally motivated and operationally effective are important areas for consideration. Recommendations emerging from the three Services, together with evidence from the field, should receive serious attention before further refinements are made.

The relevance of this debate is further underscored by the unpublished memoir of General MM Naravane, former Chief of the Army Staff, titled Four Stars of Destiny. It has been speculated, among other possible reasons and based on reports and excerpts attributed to the manuscript, that General Naravane did not support the Agnipath scheme in the form in which it was subsequently introduced and had favoured a greater proportion of personnel being retained after the initial four-year tenure. As the memoir remains unpublished, these reported views should be treated with due caution and not presented as a definitive published position of the former Army Chief. It has also been speculated that his reported reservations on Agnipath may have contributed to the difficulties surrounding publication of the memoir; however, the precise reasons for the delay are not publicly established.

The memoir is of wider significance because General Naravane was Chief of the Army Staff during the 2020 military standoff with China and India's subsequent deployment in Eastern Ladakh. His account could therefore provide valuable first-hand perspectives on the crisis, military preparedness, strategic decision-making and civil-military relations. When officially available, his views on the Agnipath scheme should neither be treated as conclusive evidence against it nor dismissed because they differed from the policy ultimately adopted. They should instead form part of the wider body of professional military experience and evidence that merits objective examination before further refinements are made to the scheme.

Two senior retired Generals from my Regiment with extensive experience of the Army, have also expressed reservations about the scheme. One pointed out that, while Agnipath may reduce the long-term pension burden and create a younger, more technologically oriented force, the recruitment-to-retirement imbalance could progressively aggravate existing manpower deficiencies. He also questioned whether a short-service system would provide the diverse experience and skills required by a modern military. The other cautioned that shorter tenures could adversely affect leader-led relationships, unit cohesiveness, camaraderie and the willingness to accept operational risks, particularly when a soldier knows that his future employment remains uncertain after four years. Both stressed that the real challenge would be the effective training and operational employment of Agniveers within the limited tenure and the credible absorption of the majority released from service.

The recent theft of weapons and ammunition from the 20 Madras Regiment at Bolarum, Seccunderabad, represents a critical security breach with far-reaching implications. Telangana DGP CV Anand announced on 11 September 2026 that a retired, disgruntled Havildar harbouring a grudge against the Commanding Officer has been arrested. While the stolen weapons have been recovered and initial investigations point to personal resentment as the motive, the scale of the theft and the apparent exploitation of insider knowledge leave lingering questions regarding potential accomplices. Although no public evidence currently implicates Agniveers or serving personnel, the possibility of collusion by internal elements cannot be entirely ruled out until the inquiry is complete. This incident underscores the urgent need for a thorough review of personnel vetting, alongside a stringent re-evaluation of standard operating procedures (SOPs) safeguarding military kotes, magazines, explosive, armouries, regimental treasury chests (RTCs) and precious silver pieces and trophies in the Officers Messes in the military units in cantonments or field areas.

Ultimately, the first batch of Agniveers has now completed its four-year tenure. The real test of the scheme will begin with what happens next: the operational contribution of those absorbed into the regular Armed Forces; the successful transition of the remaining Agniveers into the Central Armed Police Forces, State Police, Home Guards, Coast Guard, Assam Rifles and other employment avenues under Agni Pariksha Scheme; the career trajectory of those who do not secure such opportunities; and the future of personnel who leave service on medical or disciplinary grounds. The real Agni Pariksha of the Agnipath Scheme will be its long-term cost-effectiveness and impact on the Armed Forces. Under the earlier system, soldiers, sailors and airmen generally served for 15-18 years and retired relatively young, maintaining a youthful and combat-effective force. Under Agnipath, while 25 per cent are retained, the remaining 75 per cent leave after four years with substantial financial compensation and need to be rehabilitated potentially shifting the financial burden from defence to the wider exchequer. The emergence of two categories of personnel-regular and Agniveers-may also have implications for morale, unit cohesiveness and combat effectiveness. Whether the scheme ultimately proves more economical and effective than the earlier system is therefore its true Agni Pariksha.

The performance, conduct, employment and career progression of these cohorts, together with the recommendations and experience of the three Services and the considered views of senior military leaders who were involved when the scheme was formulated, will provide the most credible evidence of the true efficacy, sustainability and long-term value of the Agnipath scheme.

Postscript

As we go to press on 4 November 2026, the Government's reported decision to grant a two-year extension to 75% of Agniveers, opening avenues for their continued service, is a tacit admission of serious deficiencies in the Agnipath Scheme. This belated course correction vindicates the concerns repeatedly voiced by veterans since its inception.

The fundamental question remains: why was such a far-reaching experiment imposed on the Armed Forces without adequately assessing its adverse implications for regimental ethos, unit cohesion, accumulated experience, leadership and, above all, combat effectiveness? National security cannot be sacrificed at the altar of budgetary savings. Cutting corners in defence expenditure at the cost of operational preparedness is not reform but misplaced economy, with potentially grave consequences for the nation.

The timing of these concessions, with Assembly elections due in seven states in 2027 and nine states in 2028, also raises legitimate apprehensions about political considerations influencing defence policy.

The Armed Forces are not a laboratory for political and financial experiments. Their primary responsibility is to fight and win wars. The Agnipath Scheme demands a fundamental review, not cosmetic adjustments. The Government must put national security, soldier welfare and combat effectiveness above budgetary optics and electoral expediency. The cost of a flawed manpower policy may ultimately be paid in blood on the battlefield.