The Cradle or the Crucible? Rethinking the National Defence Academy’s Leadership Legacy

Editor's Note:

This timely and relevant piece has apparently captured the essence of several issues that have haunted NDA for past two decades. The author has identified several critical issues and suggested viable solutions . Since the NDA has recently been in the news this article would enable serving military fraternity dealing with NDA to resolve them and qualitatively improve the quality of our military leadership at take off level.  

The well researched analysis by a seasoned ex NDA veteran seems to have been inspired by recent articles on NDA by Admiral Arun Prakash ,Lt Gen HS Panag and Brig BL Poonia.

Editor , MVI

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The National Defence Academy (NDA) has long been hailed as the cradle of leadership, a

phrase meant to capture its singular role in shaping India’s future military commanders. It

was envisioned as a tri service institution where raw potential would be transformed into

disciplined, visionary leaders capable of safeguarding the nation.

Yet, over time, this metaphor has begun to lose its force. What was meant as a cradle of support now risks being seen as a crucible—an institution that imposes harsh trials on adolescents, shaping them through pressure rather than fostering growth through guidance.

In such a place, adolescence—the stage meant for exploration, risk-taking, and growth becomes a period of stagnation. Talents remain undiscovered, ambitions wither, and the

spark of possibility dims.

What could have been a painter, scientist, or leader is instead moulded into conformity, their potential stunted by confinement.

The very conditions at the National defence Academy, designed to cultivate military

leadership of the highest calibre have instead yielded bonsai rather than banyan trees.

Instead of nurturing banyan trees—leaders with expansive vision and roots deep in society—

the system produces bonsai: carefully pruned, aesthetically disciplined, but ultimately

stunted in growth. The nation’s military leadership is increasingly perceived as stunted,

having failed to produce any figure of truly outstanding stature. Unlike in other contexts,

senior officers have not risen to become Defence Ministers, National Security Advisors, or national leaders in any field. Perhaps it is the fear of military influence that drives political

leaders to sideline them from state affairs; yet the deeper issue remains the military’s

inability to produce a leader capable of capturing the nation’s imagination and securing the popular mandate to lead.

Articles by Admiral Arun Prakash, former Chief of Naval Staff and ex-Commandant of NDA

(Hindustan Times, 28 January 2024), Lt Gen HS Panag, former Army Commander (The Print,

18 July 2019), and Brig BL Poonia, VSM (Retd) (‘Pay Attention – National Defence Academy’,

13 March 2024) have collectively highlighted significant shortcomings in the training

imparted at this premier military institution. Building on their critiques, this article argues

that the very concept underpinning the preparation of future military leadership at the NDA is fundamentally flawed. It calls for a thorough review of the system to elevate it to a level at least comparable—if not superior—to the selection and training processes of the Indian Administrative Service.

Catch Them Young – A flawed Concept

The idea behind “Catch Them Young” is simple: identify adolescents early, channel their

energy into military discipline, and mould them into future leaders. The National Defence

Academy (NDA) embodies this philosophy, inducting boys at the age of 16.5–19.5 and

subjecting them to a rigorous regimen of academics, physical training, and military drill. Theassumption is that early exposure will produce leaders of exceptional calibre, hardened by discipline and loyalty.

The philosophy of catching them young may indeed be effective in producing outstanding

athletes and sportsmen. In sports, early specialization allows the body to be conditioned,

reflexes to be honed, and skills to be perfected through repetition. The focus is on physical

endurance, discipline, and mastery of technique—qualities that benefit from starting young,

when the body is most adaptable.

However, this same approach is fundamentally flawed when applied to the selection and

training of military leaders. Leadership in the armed forces is not merely about physical

prowess or mechanical skill; it demands intellectual maturity, emotional intelligence, and the ability to make complex judgments under uncertainty. These qualities emerge only after the brain has matured through education, exposure, and lived experience.

NDA – A Trap for Poor but Promising Students

India often takes pride in having a fully volunteer military, but the reality is more complex.

Most senior military leaders are graduates of the National Defence Academy (NDA). In the

early 1960s, particularly after the Indo-China war of 1962, it was recognized that the NDA

was failing to attract high-quality candidates. To address this, the government established

Sainik Schools, Military Schools, and the Rashtriya Indian Military College (RIMC) across the states as feeder institutions for the NDA. Today, nearly 100 such schools exist, and the

majority of NDA cadets come from these institutions.

Students enter these schools at the age of 10–12, often from modest backgrounds, and are

provided scholarships for their education. However, admission comes with a binding

obligation: cadets must sign a bond committing to join the NDA if selected after their

schooling. The bond stipulates that if a student refuses to appear for or join the NDA, the

entire cost of their education must be repaid to the government. Further, upon joining the

NDA at the young age of 16.5 years or more, cadets are required to sign another bond

committing themselves to at least 20 years of military service. Ironically, these young men

are compelled to make lifelong commitments to the armed forces before they are even old

enough to cast a vote in an election.

As a result, many serve not out of genuine choice but out of compulsion or the lack of viable alternatives. This system of entrapment ensures a steady supply of officers but also

suppresses their bargaining power, leaving them underpaid compared to market salaries.

What was intended as a cradle of opportunity has, for many poor but promising students,

become a trap that binds them to a career path before they are mature enough to decide

their own future.

Biology of the Brain

Research demonstrates that the limbic system—particularly the amygdala—matures years before the prefrontal cortex. This system governs emotions, rewards, and social interactions, which explains why adolescents often display heightened emotional responses and impulsivity. NDA cadets are drawn precisely from this age group. They enter the academy

after clearing a demanding UPSC examination and a rigorous five-day Service Selection

Board process involving multiple tests. Yet, at this stage of neurological development, these

young cadets cannot reasonably be expected to make lifelong, carefully considered decisions

about their future.

In contrast, the prefrontal cortex—the region responsible for judgment, impulse control, and

higher-order reasoning—continues to develop well into the mid-20s. Only around age 25 do

executive functions reach full maturity, as confirmed by numerous scientific studies. This

biological reality underscores the mismatch between the age of entry into NDA and the

cognitive demands of shaping future military leadership.

Biology is responsible for the flaws in NDA

Training Adolescents, as noted earlier, are biologically inclined toward risk-taking, impulsivity, and peer-driven behaviour, and when placed within a cohort of similarly predisposed cadets, these tendencies are magnified and solidified into tradition. At the NDA, this dynamic has long manifested in negative practices such as cheating, impersonation, petty theft, and the manhandling of juniors. For decades, such conduct has been rationalized as a means of fostering initiative, resourcefulness, or toughness, yet these justifications mask the deeper issue: the behaviours stem from the neurological immaturity of the age group itself.

As long as recruitment continues at a stage when biology predisposes cadets to such flaws, no amount of tinkering with the training framework can eliminate them, leaving the system vulnerable to perpetuating misconduct rather than nurturing visionary military leadership.

Immature Trainers

The NDA’s system of training and leadership development rests heavily on the role of

Divisional Officers (Div Os). Each squadron is overseen by a squadron commander and four

divisional officers—one each from the Navy and Air Force, and two from the Army.

While most are ex-NDA officers with commendable service records, they are typically only around 25 years old when posted to the academy. Despite their youth and lack of formal

preparation for the role, they are entrusted with the demanding responsibility of shaping

the training and character of nearly 50 cadets. In practice, without structured training in

pedagogy or leadership development, many Div Os end up behaving more like senior cadets

than mentors. Their tenure is short—barely two years—and just as they begin to gain

proficiency through on-the-job experience, they are rotated out.

Expecting such young and untrained officers to carry the burden of moulding future military leaders is fundamentally flawed and constitutes a major reason for the persistent shortcomings in leadership development at the NDA.Excessive Focus on Physical Training and Drill The NDA’s training framework continues to emphasize physical training and drill as central pillars. While these elements may be valuable for soldiers and junior leaders, they contribute little to the cultivation of higher-order leadership qualities in cadets. Historically, physical endurance and drill discipline were critical during the world wars, when warfare was manpower-intensive and technologically unsophisticated. However, the revolution in military affairs has fundamentally altered the demands placed on future leaders.

Modern warfare is defined by complexity, technology, and information dominance.

Leaders today are required to operate in dispersed environments, often in isolation, making rapid decisions with strategic consequences without ever leaving their command centers. Success depends less on physical stamina and more on cognitive agility, systems thinking, and the ability to integrate intelligence, technology, and diplomacy into military strategy.

In this context, excessive time devoted to physical training and drill represents a misallocation of scarce training resources. Physical fitness should remain a baseline requirement—tested and maintained by individuals—but it should not consume the bulk of institutional training time. Instead, the academy must prioritize intellectual development, critical thinking, ethical reasoning, and exposure to emerging technologies. Only by shifting focus from rote physical routines to the cultivation of strategic minds can the NDA prepare cadets to lead in the wars of tomorrow.

No Time for Silent Contemplation or Critical

Thinking One of the most serious shortcomings of the NDA’s training system is the absence of space for reflection and intellectual growth. Cadets are kept under relentless schedules of physical training, drill, and routine tasks, leaving little opportunity for silent contemplation or the

cultivation of independent thought. Leadership, however, is not forged merely through

discipline and endurance; it requires the ability to pause, reflect, and critically evaluate

complex situations.

The absence of contemplative space has two damaging effects: first, it stunts the

development of strategic imagination, leaving officers technically competent but

intellectually narrow; second, it discourages moral courage, as cadets are conditioned to

follow orders rather than wrestle with ethical dilemmas. In contrast, institutions that nurture

leaders—whether in civil services, academia, or global military academies—deliberately

carve out time for reflection, reading, and dialogue, recognizing that leadership is as much

about thought as it is about action.

Lower Order Competence in Public Perception

A persistent anomaly exists in how the public perceives NDA graduates compared to those

entering the Indian Administrative Service (IAS). Despite clearing a rigorous UPSC examination and an exhaustive Service Selection Board process, NDA cadets are often seenas less educated or competent than their IAS counterparts. This fact is evident from the

denial of NFFU to the military leaders. This perception is misleading. Military leaders are in

no way inferior in intellect or capability; their training emphasizes discipline, resilience, and

operational leadership under extreme conditions—qualities that are indispensable for

national security.

The real gap lies not in competence but in exposure. Senior military officers, whose careers

are largely confined to defence institutions, often lack direct experience in the broader

machinery of governance. As a result, they are less visible in civil administration and less

likely to be considered for senior government posts outside the military. Correcting this

imbalance is critical. Greater integration of military officers into civil institutions—through

structured cross-postings, joint training programs, and policy roles—would not only dispel misconceptions but also strengthen coordination between the armed forces and civilian organs of the state.

This reform is not merely cosmetic. Future wars will demand a whole-of-government

approach, where military, diplomatic, economic, and technological instruments of power

must be synchronized seamlessly. Bridging the divide between military and civil leadership is

therefore essential to national preparedness. By correcting the anomaly in perception and

practice, India can ensure that its military leaders are recognized not only as defenders of

the nation but also as strategic thinkers capable of contributing to governance at the highest

levels.

Way Ahead – Selection of Military leadership through UPSC Examination for IAS

India must rethink how it selects future military leaders. At present, NDA cadets are

recruited at 16–17 years of age, long before their cognitive maturity has fully developed, and

are bound to lifelong commitments they are scarcely equipped to make. In contrast, IAS

officers enter through the UPSC Civil Services Examination after completing higher

education, ensuring intellectual maturity, diverse exposure, and a broader worldview.

Aligning military leadership selection with the UPSC framework would allow candidates to

be chosen later, when their judgment and foresight are more developed, and would broaden the talent pool by attracting individuals with varied academic backgrounds.

Such reform would also correct the anomaly of public perception, where military officers are

often seen as less qualified than their civil service counterparts. By placing military

leadership selection on par with the IAS, India would elevate the stature of the armed

forces, strengthen integration between military and civil institutions, and prepare leaders for

the “whole-of-government” approach that modern warfare demands. This shift would

ensure that future commanders are not only disciplined executors but also visionary thinkers

capable of inspiring confidence across the nation.

Training at NDA

The NDA’s training should be restructured into a focused two-year program. The first year

must emphasize the art of warfare, equipping cadets with the fundamentals of military

science, tactics, strategy, discipline, and battlefield leadership. Alongside these core skills, cadets should also study geopolitics and India’s role in global affairs, ensuring they develop both professional military competence and a broader strategic outlook. This phase would instil the ethos and expertise essential for their responsibilities as future military officers.

The second year should then mirror the training provided to IAS officers at the Lal Bahadur

Shastri National Academy of Administration (LBSNAA), exposing cadets to governance,

public policy, economics, technology, and national security decision-making. Such a dual

structure would produce leaders who are not only proficient in the conduct of war but also

capable of operating within a whole-of-government framework, bridging the civil-military divide and preparing India’s armed forces for the complexities of modern conflict.

Trainers at NDA

Trainers at the NDA should be drawn from diverse fields of expertise—military science,

technology, geopolitics, economics, and public policy—so that cadets are exposed to a broad

spectrum of knowledge essential for modern leadership. Their appointments should be

tenure-based, ideally for five years, allowing sufficient time to develop continuity, depth, and

meaningful mentorship. In addition to training cadets, these officers and experts should be

tasked with producing research papers on national security and strategy, thereby

contributing to the intellectual capital of the armed forces while ensuring that the academy

itself evolves as a hub of thought leadership.

Exposure to Various Organs of Government

To realize their full potential, ex-NDA officers should be systematically exposed to service

across different organs of the state beyond the armed forces. While their training equips

them with discipline, resilience, and operational leadership, their effectiveness as senior

leaders is often limited by a narrow focus on defense institutions. Structured postings in

ministries, public agencies, and policy bodies would broaden their understanding of

governance, economics, technology, and diplomacy, preparing them for leadership roles that demand a whole-of-government perspective.

This exposure would also benefit the departments in which they serve. Military officers bring with them the discipline, integrity, and ethos of hard work and dedication ingrained through their training. By embedding these values into civilian institutions, they can raise standards of efficiency, accountability, and professionalism. Such integration would strengthen civil-military coordination, correct the perception gap between military and civil officers, and ensure India’s future leaders are strategic thinkers capable of contributing meaningfully to both national security and governance.

Conclusion

The National Defence Academy was envisioned as the cradle of India’s military leadership, yet its current structure has fallen short of that promise. By recruiting adolescents too early, overemphasizing drill and physical training, and failing to provide intellectual space for reflection, the NDA has constrained the very qualities—strategic imagination, ethical

judgment, and visionary thinking—that modern military leadership requires.

The result is that the true potential of India’s military leaders is being wasted. Poorly

designed training, combined with limited exposure to the wider organs of the state, has left officers technically competent but intellectually narrow, unable to fully contribute to governance or inspire national confidence. Unlike their civil service counterparts, they

remain confined to defence institutions, missing opportunities to broaden their perspectives

and strengthen civil-military synergy.

Correcting these flaws demands bold reform: aligning military leadership selection with the

UPSC framework, restructuring NDA training into a balanced two-year program, appointing

tenure-based trainers who also contribute to national security scholarship, and

systematically integrating officers into civil institutions.

Only by nurturing leaders with both military expertise and governance exposure can India prepare for the whole-of-government approach that future wars will demand. By unlocking the wasted potential of its officers,

India can ensure its armed forces produce leaders who are not only defenders of the nation

but also strategic thinkers capable of guiding it through the complexities of the twenty-first

century