BEYOND THE AGNIPATH SCHEME :MILITARY REFORMS NEED TRANSPARENCY, OWNERSHIP & ACCOUNTABILITY By Col Narinder Singh Dahiya (Retd)

When Defence Minister Swaran Singh once expected military action at short notice, Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw reportedly told him:

“Minister, military operations are not like the Book of Genesis. You cannot simply say, ‘Let there be light,’ and suddenly there is light! Things take time, preparation and logistics.”

Today, Indian defence policy-making increasingly resembles the Book of Genesis.

When the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) recently appeared on television to announce an additional two years of service for Agniveers, it felt as though a major shift in national military recruitment had been conjured up overnight.

The original Agnipath scheme was unveiled in much the same sudden manner in June 2022.

We have seen this exact pattern in senior leadership appointments too.

In June 2022, while the CDS post lay vacant, the Government abruptly amended the appointment rules—widening the eligibility pool from just the three Service Chiefs to include serving and recently retired three-star officers.

In a similar fashion, the eligibility criteria for Army Commanders were also altered mid-stream, shifting established promotion norms without transparent institutional debate. Changing the rules of the game after the fact raises fair questions about planning and preparedness.

The issue here isn't whether these individual decisions are right or wrong. It is that major policies affecting the Armed Forces should never look like hurried, ad-hoc experiments justified later.

Veterans have spent years debating whether Agnipath helps or hurts regimental cohesion, training, and pension bills. Those details matter, but they miss the bigger picture.

The real problem is not Agnipath. It is the opaque, top-down way major military decisions are made.

'A pattern of hasty policies and costly rollbacks' :

A sound policy requires defining the problem, weighing alternatives, consulting professionals, and accepting accountability. Instead, we see a recurring cycle of hurried announcements followed by painful corrections:

Rations: The move to replace entitled rations with cash allowances had to be rolled back.

Women’s service: Repeated Supreme Court interventions were required to fix inconsistent policies on permanent commissions and terms of service—an institutional vacuum the judiciary shouldn't have had to fill.

Reviewing a policy based on new evidence is good governance. Reversing a policy because its consequences weren't thought through is poor preparation. Every rollback erodes institutional trust, yet no one is ever held accountable for the initial miscalculation.

'Authority without skin in the game' :

Civilian supremacy over the military is a cornerstone of our democracy. The Government has the final say. However, civilian control must be guided by candid military advice, not exercised by administrative fiat.

The deepest flaw in our current system is the disconnect between those who make the rules and those who live with them:

Decision-makers—politicians, bureaucrats, and senior military leaders, most of whom are on their last-leg postings—move on to other ministries, retire, or finish their terms long before a policy's long-term impact is felt.

Soldiers and Commanding Officers cannot walk away. A CO must train, lead, and take troops into combat regardless of how flawed the recruitment model might be.

Were Commanding Officers, regimental centres, and training establishments consulted before Agnipath was launched? Were dissenting views recorded? Consultation does not mean giving the military a veto; it means listening to the people who have to execute the plan so you don't make avoidable mistakes.

'Put a name to the reform' :

To ensure quality in public works, we require contractors to publicly display their names at the construction site. Similarly, landmark committees are remembered by the people who led them—just as the restructuring of military ranks is universally known as the AV Singh Committee report.

Major military reforms should follow the exact same principle. Every sweeping policy change must carry the name of the official or leader who conceived and recommended it. Putting a face to the reform ensures genuine ownership—and stops failed policies from being conveniently blamed on faceless bureaucrats years later.

'How defence policy should be made':

Before any major military reform is announced, the establishment should be required to answer five basic questions on the record:

What exact problem are we trying to solve?

What alternatives were considered and rejected?

Who on the ground was consulted, and what objections did they raise?

What are the long-term impacts on unit cohesion, morale, and operational readiness?

Who is accountable for reviewing the policy and owning its outcomes?

'Demand a better system' :

Veterans should look beyond simply supporting or opposing Agnipath. We must demand a transparent, accountable policy-making process across the board—from recruitment and pensions to senior appointments and force restructuring.

As Manekshaw knew, you cannot run an army on sudden announcements. A military institution is not a laboratory for administrative experiments.

Authority is not a blank cheque. Those who hold the power to decide owe the institution an explanation.